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Organizational researchers are increasingly interested in how organizations are 
perceived by their constituents, because such perceptions have important implications for 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation and organizational outcomes. In this two-
essay dissertation, I focus on a specific type of social approval asset, celebrity – the 
extent to which a social actor attains high levels of public attention and elicits positive 
emotional responses. Specifically, I examine how celebrity emerges at different 
organizational levels.  
In Essay 1, I first develop a theoretical multilevel framework of business 
celebrity, building on agenda setting theory and framing theory. Second, I propose a 
typology of business celebrity based on the different types of media narratives that foster 
its creations at different organizational levels. Third, I develop a set of theoretically 
driven propositions to examine contingency factors under which specific types of media 
causal attributions are more likely to emerge.  
In Essay 2, I empirically test under what conditions celebrity is more likely to 
emerge at the CEO or organizational level. On a sample of U.S. firms and CEOs from the 
Fortune 500 and the Unicorns lists, I investigate the role of organizational competitive 
actions, temporal information and communication materials in determining the 
development of celebrity at different organizational levels. 
 Taken together the two essays examine the media attributional processes behind 
the development of individual and organizational celebrity. Specifically, this dissertation 
proposes theoretical arguments and empirical tests to suggest that individual and 
organizational celebrity emerge as journalists develop causal attributions about business 
events, and imprint those attributions in their reporting about organizational life. 
Moreover, the development of individual and organizational celebrity can be 
characterized as a frame dispute affected by not only the media understanding of specific 
events, but also by the agency exerted by organizations and their members in promoting 
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Constituents’ perceptions of organizations have important implications for 
strategy formulation, strategy implementation and organizational outcomes (Rindova, 
Pollock, & Hayward, 2006). Consequently, a substantial body of research has developed 
within organizational studies, to identify how these perceptions are formed and to 
investigate how they affect organizational processes and outcomes (e.g.: Graffin, Bundy, 
Porac, Wade, & Quinn, 2013b; Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Rindova et al., 
2006; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard, 2016b).  
Social approval assets are a special category of intangible resources that derive 
their value from the favorable collective perceptions associated with them (Pfarrer, 
Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Information intermediaries, such as the media, play a 
fundamental role in determining how these perceptions are formed and how they evolve 
over time (Deephouse, 2000; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2006). One important 
type of social approval asset is celebrity. Celebrities are social actors that attract high 
levels of public attention and elicit positive emotional responses from the public 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). In modern societies, celebrity is a product of 
mass communication (Boorstin, 1961; Gamson, 1992; Rein, Kotler, & Stoller, 1987; 
Rindova et al., 2006) and, within the business context, it can emerge at both the 
individual (Hayward et al., 2004) and the organizational level (Rindova et al., 2006), as 
the media develop “dramatized realities” (Rindova et al., 2006: 50) in their reporting 
about organizational life and business events.  
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Previous research has explored both antecedents and consequences of individual 
(see Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen, Adams, & Shook, 2008; 
Ranft, Ferris, & Perryman, 2007; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006, 2008) and 
organizational celebrity, (see Kjærgaard, Morsing, & Ravasi, 2011; Perryman, 2008; 
Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2006). Emerging from these studies is an initial 
understanding of how individual and organizational celebrity are achieved, and an 
appreciation of their distinctive effects on individual and organizational outcomes. 
Overall, individual and organizational celebrity have been theorized to have 
different, yet similar, development processes (see Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 
2006) as well as different effects on organizational outcomes (see Graffin, Pfarrer, & 
Hill, 2012b; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006). Specifically, empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the positive effect of CEO celebrity on organizational performance is 
short lived, and in the long-term CEO celebrity seems to negatively affect organizational 
returns (Wade et al., 2006), while organizational celebrity seems to have positive effects 
on organizational performance, as it fosters the adoption by stakeholders of positive 
affective frames towards the organization (Pfarrer et al., 2010).  
Notwithstanding the growing body of literature on celebrity, this stream of 
research suffers from two main limitations. First, researchers have focused most of the 
empirical efforts to investigate the consequences of this important social approval asset, 
disregarding for the most part the need to empirically test of the antecedents theoretically 
identified as important for the achievement of celebrity. Second, notwithstanding the 
evidences supporting the idea that individual and organizational celebrity may have 
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different implications for organizational outcomes, research on the two constructs has 
proceeded mostly independently, hampering our understanding not only of how 
individual and organizational celebrity are achieved respectively, but also of how they 
co-evolve over time.  
Addressing these gaps in the literature, I investigate the research question: why 
and under what conditions do the media adopt the individual or organizational 
attributional frames that foster the creation of individual and organizational celebrity 
respectively? In Essay 1, I develop a multi-level model of business celebrity building on 
the central role played by the media in disseminating the type of narratives needed to cast 
a social actor as a celebrity (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). In Essay 2, I 
empirically investigate factors that affect the development of CEO and organizational 
celebrity, respectively.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is threefold. First, I aim to advance celebrity 
theory by identifying how it emerges at different organizational levels. Second, I set to 
understand how individual and organizational celebrity co-evolve by identifying how 
multi-level celebrity dynamics unfold over time, and with what performance 
implications. Third, I provide an empirical test of the antecedents that the theory on 
celebrity has identified as fostering the development of this important social approval 
asset.  
Specifically, in Essay 1, I take a constructivist approach (Gamson & Modigliani, 
1994) and, building on framing theory (Entman, 1993), I theorize about factors that affect 
the resonance of the individual or organizational attributional frames that, in combination 
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with positive affective frames, foster the development of individual or organizational 
celebrity. I then identify possible co-evolution dynamics of celebrity across 
organizational levels, and discuss specific performance advantages and disadvantages 
that may arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity, since such implications are 
important in providing a picture of the complex ways in which different social approval 
assets contribute to organizational performance.  
Essay 1 provides multiple theoretical contributions. First, I contribute to the 
literature on social approval assets by developing a multi-level model of business 
celebrity that provides a more accurate picture of how media attention to organizations 
and their members comes about, and how it develops over time. Second, by considering 
how different forms of media narratives co-evolve over time, I contribute to celebrity 
theory by exploring how celebrity dynamics can affect the sustainability of these social 
approval assets over time. Lastly, by discussing performance implications of individual 
and organizational celebrity, I contribute to the strategic management literature by 
delineating the relationship between a combination of social approval assets and 
organizational competitive advantage. 
In Essay 2, an empirical study, I hypothesize and test empirically under what 
conditions CEO and organizational celebrity are more likely to emerge. Specifically, I 
suggest that organizational celebrity is more likely to occur when positively valued 
competitive actions that are highly distinctive are undertaken in the presence of 
organizational communication materials that are framed at the organizational level. On 
the other hand, CEO celebrity is more likely to occur when positively charged 
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competitive actions that are highly distinctive are undertaken i) in the presence of 
organizational communication materials that are framed at the CEO-level, iii) early on 
during the tenure of a CEO, and iii) in the presence of a CEO that was also part of the 
founding team. I test these hypotheses on a sample of 244 organizations from the Fortune 
500 and the Unicorns lists, and find only partial support. Specifically, I find support for 
the idea that the more the positive competitive actions undertaken by a company, the 
greater the organizational celebrity. However, the distinctiveness of competitive actions 
is does not moderate this mediation, while organizational communication materials 
framed at the organizational level do. On the other hand, no support is found for the idea 
that competitive actions foster the development of CEO celebrity, independently from 
their level of distinctive, the frames in the organizational communication materials, and 
the tenure of the CEO. However, when the CEO is also the founder, competitive actions 
become relevant predictors of CEO celebrity. 
In Essay 2, I provide multiple contributions to theory and practice. First, I 
contribute to theory on celebrity by empirically testing the antecedences that have been 
identified as leading to the development of this social approval asset. Second, I contribute 
to the literature on celebrity by testing under what conditions celebrity emerges at the 
individual or organizational level, respectively. Lastly, I contribute to the literature on 
celebrity by providing insights on how organizations and their members have agency in 
affecting media attributions about business events.  
Taken together, the two essays investigate the media’s attributional processes 
behind the development of individual or organizational celebrity. Specifically, I provide 
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theoretical arguments to suggest that individual and organizational celebrity emerge as 
journalists develop causal attributions about business events, and imprint those 
attributions in the narrative frames adopted in their reporting. Overall, therefore, the 
development of individual or organizational celebrity can be characterized as a ‘framing 
contest’ affected not only by the media understanding and interpretation of specific 
events, but also by the agency of organizations and their members, in promoting specific 




1. CHAPTER I - 
A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF BUSINESS CELEBRITY: 






CEOs and entrepreneurs or entire organizations often become celebrities known 
and acclaimed by audiences within and beyond the boundaries of their industries. 
Previous research has investigated antecedents and consequences of individual- and 
organizational-celebrity, specifically focusing on the role played by the media as the 
central information intermediary for the development of these social approval assets. 
Nevertheless, research on individual and organizational celebrity has proceeded largely 
independently, hampering our understanding of business celebrity in multiple ways. I 
address the limitations of the current literature and develop a multi-level theory of 
business celebrity, focusing on the relative availability of attributional frames that foster 
the development of celebrity at different levels. I contribute to celebrity theory in three 
main ways. First, I identify the factors that influence its development at one level rather 
than the other, or why and how it can emerge at both the individual and organizational 
levels. Second, I theorize how individual and organizational celebrity co-evolve over 
time. Third, I discuss performance implications of business celebrity when it 
concomitantly occurs at the individual and organizational levels. 
Introduction 
 
Celebrity is a pervasive phenomenon in modern society (Gamson, 1992; Rindova 
et al., 2006) and, transcending its original boundaries, has become a relevant factor in the 
business context. Often CEOs and entrepreneurs (e.g. Mark Zuckerberg and Jack Welch) 
or entire organizations (e.g. Apple and Tesla) are in the spotlight and become celebrities 
known and acclaimed by audiences within and beyond the boundaries of their industries. 
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Given its pervasiveness, celebrity has attracted attention across multiple disciplines, 
ranging from marketing (McCracken, 1989; Rein et al., 1987) to sociology (Ferris, 2007; 
Rojek, 2004; Van de Rijt, Shor, Ward, & Skiena, 2013), communication (Austin, Vord, 
Pinkleton, & Epstein, 2008; Gamson, 1992; Slater, 2002), and organizational studies 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Such an interdisciplinary approach to the 
construct has generated a diverse and multifaceted representation of what celebrity is, and 
its antecedents and consequences.  
Within the context of organizational studies, celebrities are defined as social 
actors that attract a high levels of public attention and elicit positive emotional responses 
from their audiences, often through the mediating role of media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 
2016; Rindova et al., 2006). Similarly to other social approval assets such as status, 
reputation, and legitimacy, celebrity is important because constituents’ perceptions of 
organizations and their leaders have critical implications for strategy formulation, 
strategy implementation and organizational outcomes (Rindova et al., 2006). In general, 
previous research has investigated antecedents and consequences of individual (see 
Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen et al., 2008; Ranft et al., 
2007; Wade et al., 2006, 2008) and organizational celebrity, (see Kjærgaard et al., 2011; 
Perryman, 2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rindova et al., 2006), specifically focusing on the 
role played by the media as the central information intermediary for the development of 
these social approval assets. Emerging from these studies is an initial understanding of 
how individual and organizational celebrity are achieved, and an appreciation of their 
distinctive effects on individual and organizational outcomes. 
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 Nevertheless, research on individual and organizational celebrity has largely 
proceeded on separate, isolated tracks, despite suggestions that the two are 
interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006) with only few exceptions (see Perryman, 2008). 
These parallel yet insulated research streams have affected our understanding of celebrity 
in organizations in three main ways. First, we lack an understanding of the factors that 
influence the development of celebrity at one level rather than the other, or why and how 
it can emerge at both the individual and organizational levels. This distinction is 
important since research has shown that individual and organizational celebrity have 
different effects on organizational outcomes (see Graffin et al., 2012b; Pfarrer et al., 
2010; Wade et al., 2006). Second, by investigating individual and organizational celebrity 
independently, current theory on celebrity limits our understanding of how they co-
evolve over time. Often, celebrity individuals such as CEOs or entrepreneurs are involved 
in an organization’s celebrity development process (Rindova et al., 2006) and vice versa. 
Yet, research thus far has not addressed this issue and, adopting a fairly static approach to 
the study of this phenomenon, disregards how multi-level celebrity dynamics unfold over 
time. This is problematic as individual and organizational celebrity are interdependent 
(Rindova et al., 2006) ant theorized to be relatively unstable when compared to other 
important social approval assets such as reputation, status or legitimacy. Lastly, by 
investigating individual and organizational celebrity independently, current theory on 
celebrity does not provide an understanding of the performance implications of these two 
constructs when occurring together. Indeed, previous literature has only investigated the 
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performance implications of individual and organizational celebrity separately (Pfarrer et 
al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006).  
I address these opportunities to unite this literature and develop a multi-level 
model of business celebrity, building on the central role played by the media in 
disseminating the type of narratives needed to cast a social actor as a celebrity (Hayward 
et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). First, I investigate why and how the media choose to 
frame their narratives at the individual and/or the organizational level, developing the 
dramatized realities that foster the emergence of individual and/or organizational 
celebrity, respectively. In doing so, I take a constructivist approach (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1994) and, building on framing theory (Entman, 1993), suggest that media 
discourse about business events entails interpretative packages at the core of which are 
not only attributional frames (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006) but also other 
cognitive and affective frames. I theorize that when business events occur that are 
newsworthy, the adoption of individual or organizational attributional frames in media 
narratives, in combination with positive affective frames, will foster the development of 
individual or organizational celebrity. I then identify factors that affect this adoption 
process and theorize that the choice of attributional frame is affected by their resonance 
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013).  
Second, I theorize about the possible co-evolution dynamics of celebrity across 
organizational levels. In doing so, I theorize about two possible evolution patterns: 
cooperative and competitive celebrity dynamics. Cooperative dynamics occur when there 
is a shift from either individual or organizational celebrity towards a combination of the 
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two. Competitive dynamics occur when there is a shift from a combination of individual 
and organizational celebrity towards only one of the two. Further, I identify factors that 
can foster the development of cooperative celebrity dynamics. Specifically, the choice of 
frames in media narratives is influenced by changes in: the types of other cognitive 
frames adopted in media narratives, an individual’s identification processes with the 
organization, and the organizational culture. 
Finally, I discuss specific performance advantages and disadvantages that may 
arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity when compared to the possession of 
either one. I do not develop formal propositions about such performance implications 
given that the theoretical focus is on the development and co-evolution processes of these 
two distinctive, yet highly interrelated, social approval assets. Nevertheless, I discuss 
such implications as they are important in providing a picture of the complex ways in 
which different social approval assets contribute to organizational performance.  
In developing the theory, I provide multiple contributions. First, I contribute to 
celebrity theory by developing a multi-level model of business celebrity that bridges 
research on the construct at the individual and organizational levels. The constructs of 
individual and organizational celebrity have been treated independently in most studies. 
Nevertheless, they are interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006) and may have synergistic or 
competitive effects on organizational outcomes. Therefore, treating individual and 
organizational celebrity autonomously does not provide the most accurate picture of how 
media coverage of organizations and their members comes about and how it develops 
over time. This model offers understanding of the circumstances under which the media 
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adopt an organizational- or an individual-level frame, leading to the development of 
different types of celebrity. Second, by investigating how these different forms of media 
narratives may co-evolve over time, I contribute to celebrity theory by pinpointing 
celebrity dynamics that affect the sustainability of these social approval assets over time. 
Also, I identify appropriability issues by isolating situations under which the individual 
and the organization may ‘compete’ (instead of cooperate) to attain or maintain celebrity. 
Lastly, by discussing performance implications of individual and organizational celebrity, 
I contribute to the strategic management literature by delineating the relationship between 
a combination of social approval assets and organizational competitive advantage. 
Business Celebrity 
The word ‘celebrity’ derives from the Latin word ‘celebritatem’ meaning 
condition of being famous or renowned. Four defining characteristics seem to delineate 
the definition of celebrity within organizational studies: celebrities are i) social actors, 
that attract high levels of ii) public attention, and elicit iii) positive emotional responses 
from the public, due to their positive valence for the audience, iv) through the mediating 
role of media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006).  
In organizational studies on celebrity, both individuals and organizations have been 
studied as ‘social actors’ that can attain this social approval asset. I briefly review the 
literature on individual and organizational celebrity before theorizing about why and how 





At the individual level, celebrity is theorized to emerge as the media attribute a 
firm’s actions and positive performance to its leader (typically the CEO or founder), 
rather than to organizational and environmental constraints, or luck (Hayward et al., 
2004). Specifically, individual celebrity emerges as the media develop and promote 
individual-level attributions about non-conforming organizational actions (Hayward et 
al., 2004) – as media attention is affected by the saliency of those actions (Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013). Also, the likelihood of such attributions is increased when the individual is 
associated with similar actions across different contexts and circumstances (Hayward et 
al., 2004), and when information about his/her idiosyncratic behaviors are highly 
available (Hayward et al., 2004).  
From an empirical stand-point, both antecedents and consequences of individual 
celebrity have been investigated. On the one hand, researchers investigating the 
antecedents of individual celebrity found that the media tend to overstate individuals’ 
contributions to firm performance, as leadership is often construed as a central 
organizational process representing the main explanatory factor to comprehend 
organizational actions and performance (Chen & Meindl, 1991; Meindl, Ehrlich, & 
Dukerich, 1985). Due to motivational (Staw & Sutton, 1992) and cognitive factors 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977), as well as information-processing 
constraints and work demands typical of the journalistic profession (Gitlin, 1980; 
Hayward et al., 2004; Tuchman, 1978), journalists tend to interpret important, yet 
causally ambiguous business events, using leadership explanations (Hayward et al., 2004; 
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Meindl et al., 1985). On the other hand, researchers investigating the consequences of 
individual celebrity found that it is positively related to compensation contingent on 
positive organizational performance (Wade et al., 2006). When subsequent organizational 
performance is poor, individual celebrity will negatively affect compensation (Wade et 
al., 2006). As such, compensation of celebrity CEOs, for example, is more tightly 
coupled with organizational performance, than compensation of non-celebrity CEOs 
(Wade et al., 2006). These findings seem to be in line with the idea that celebrity, as well 
as other social approval assets foster higher expectations for the future and, therefore, can 
bring both benefits and burdens (Graffin et al., 2012b; Zavyalova et al., 2016b).  
Similar results can be found when looking at the effects of individual celebrity on 
organizational-level outcomes. Celebrity leaders can facilitate value creation for their 
organizations by way of their stardom increasing credibility among stakeholders and 
fostering the perception of high quality and greater potential (Wade et al., 2006). 
However, favorable media attributions can also foster an individual’s self-esteem and 
perception of importance, facilitating the development of hubris and consequent biased 
decision making processes (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sinha, Inkson, & Barker, 
2012). Also, celebrity leaders may be penalized by the fact that they generate higher 
expectations among stakeholders, and those expectations are more likely to be 
disappointed (Graffin et al., 2012b). Empirical evidences demonstrate that the positive 
effect of CEO celebrity on organizational performance is short lived, and in the long-term 
CEO celebrity seems to negatively affect organizational returns (Wade et al., 2006). 
Moreover, at the individual level, celebrity is mobile across firms (e.g. CEO succession) 
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and, consequently, it cannot be considered a stable resource for the organization (Graffin 
et al., 2012b). 
Organizational Celebrity 
At the organizational level, celebrity emerges as the media create “dramatized 
realities” attributing extraordinary qualities to organizations while reporting about 
industry or societal changes (Rindova et al., 2006: 52). Specifically, firms undertaking 
distinctive actions and displaying distinctive identities are theorized to more likely be the 
center of media attention, as journalists will use them as “vivid examples of important 
changes in industries and society in general” (Rindova et al., 2006: 52). By focusing 
attention on these organizations, the media emotionally engage audiences through the 
creation of a dramatized reality. Once again, the emergence of organizational celebrity is 
fostered by the availability of idiosyncratic information about the organization, in such a 
way that the more the organization or the CEO provides the media with information 
about organizational activities, culture, and identity, the more likely organizational 
celebrity will emerge (Rindova et al., 2006).  
Once developed, organizational celebrity has multiple effects on organizational 
decision making and change processes. First, intense positive media coverage has both a 
sense-making and self-enhancement effect on organizational members (Kjærgaard et al., 
2011), consequently affecting organizational processes and outcomes. For example, 
research shows that over time organizational celebrity may impede identity work by 
organizational members as the positive media coverage is too appealing for 
organizational members, even when it contrasts with the reality they experience within 
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the organization (Kjærgaard et al., 2011). To a certain extent, “as the media publicizes 
information about an organization, public impressions of the organization and of the 
organization’s members become part of the currency through which member’s self-
concepts and identifications are built or are eroded” (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 
1994: 241). Therefore, as much as positive media attention to CEOs can lead them to 
‘believe their own press’ (Hayward et al., 2004), similarly, positive media attention to the 
organization seems to affect members perceptions of the organizational identity above 
and beyond what they experience directly.  
Second, firms that have achieved celebrity are more likely to announce positive 
earnings surprises than firms without this asset (Pfarrer et al., 2010), as celebrity is 
developed through engaging in non-conforming actions with “harder-to-predict 
outcomes” (Pfarrer et al., 2010: 1134). Also, celebrity firms tend to receive greater 
market rewards when announcing positive earnings surprises as shareholders expect 
greater unpredictability while maintaining a positive affective frame (Pfarrer et al., 2010). 
In addition, celebrity firms receive smaller market penalties when announcing negative 
earnings surprises as a positive affective frame may foster the likelihood that 
shareholders may disregard discrepant information (Pfarrer et al., 2010). However, theory 
on organizational celebrity suggests that this social approval asset may be short-lived 
when compared to other organizational social evaluations (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, & Reger, 
2016a). Nevertheless, since unlike individual celebrity organizational celebrity is tied to 
the organization as a whole, it is less mobile across organizations than CEO celebrity and, 
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consequently, can be considered a more stable resource for the organization (Graffin et 
al., 2012b).  
To summarize, once developed, individual and organizational celebrity seem to 
have different consequences for organizational performance. In the long term, CEO 
celebrity seems to negatively affect organizational returns (Wade et al., 2006) as it 
generates higher stakeholder expectations while also fostering hubris and consequently 
biased decision making processes. Conversely, organizational celebrity seems to increase 
organizational performance as it fosters the adoption by stakeholders of a positive affect 
frame towards the organization. Also, at the individual level, celebrity is mobile across 
organizations, while it is not at the organizational level. Consequently, organizational 
celebrity has a greater potential to constitute a strategic resource for the organization 
(Barney, 1991). For these reasons, there is great value in investigating these two 
constructs concomitantly to understand how celebrity develops at different levels and 
how it evolves across them. 
Business Celebrity as a Framing Contest 
As shown in the discussion of the previous literature, there is general consensus 
that celebrities are well known social actors whose existence is inextricably related to the 
media (Boorstin, 1961; Hayward et al., 2004; Rojek, 2004). In modern society, celebrity 
(at both the individual and organizational level) is a product of mass communication 
(Boorstin, 1961; Gamson, 1992; Rein et al., 1987; Rindova et al., 2006), and is closely 
related to media coverage (Van de Rijt et al., 2013).  
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As social institutions directed toward the production of knowledge and culture 
(McQuail, 1985: 97), the media are very relevant in determining the way in which 
stakeholders and the general public make sense of organizations (Hayward et al., 2004; 
McCombs, 2005; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Shaw & McCombs, 1977) and reality in 
general. Indeed, “media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct 
meaning” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989: 2). Given causal ambiguities around the 
determinants of business events, the media become important agents in the construction 
of perceptions about organizational life, by adopting and disseminating specific 
interpretations (Wade et al., 2006). Considering the importance of the media agenda-
setting process in determining celebrity, I set out to understand how media agenda is built 
in the context of business celebrity, and apply framing theory (Entman, 1993; Entman, 
Matthes, & Pellicano, 2009) to understand how specific narrative frames are selected and 
promoted within media coverage of business news to generate celebrity. 
Journalists make sense of business events by developing narratives about them. 
Such narratives are “thematic sequenced accounts that convey meaning” (Barry & Elmes, 
1997: 431) and specific interpretations of reality to their audiences, through a framing 
activity (Entman, 1993). Multiple journalistic frames – i.e. a schema or heuristic, a 
knowledge structure that is activated by some stimulus and is then employed by a 
journalist through story construction (Entman et al., 2009) – are usually embedded in 
these narratives (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983). Typically, a narrative text describes a 
progression of events (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983) and entails several deep-level features 
(Pentland, 1999) that can be categorized as cognitive or affective frames (McCombs, 
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Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey, 1997). First, cognitive frames regard the substantive 
attributes used to describe and portray a specific object in the media – e.g. narrative 
sequence of events, causal explanations/attributions, focal actors, and so on. Second, 
affective frames regard the affective attributes used to describe and portray a specific 
object in the media – e.g. positive, negative and neutral descriptions (McCombs et al., 
1997).  
Drawing from these two categories, I focus on three specific frames: i) narrative 
sequence of events, ii) attributional, and iii) affective frames. First, a narrative sequence 
of events is a typical feature of a text (Barthes, 1988; Bruner, 1990). Once a business 
event occurs that is selected by the media for coverage, journalists frame it by selecting 
how to present the sequence of events in their narratives. It is important to note that, 
following this process, an ‘objective’ business event can originate very different media 
narratives. For example, after the launch of a new product, media reporting about this 
event may adopt a sequence of events frame from across any of these levels: the 
organizational-level with a story on how the product is the expression of a new strategic 
direction and how it will foster organizational performance, the industry-level with a 
story on how the product will bring change in the industry, or the societal-level with a 
story on how the product will bring change in society.  
Second, attributional frames are also embedded in media narratives about 
business events (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). In general, several social 
actors can serve as focal actors for attribution in media narratives about business events, 
as stories can be about individual, groups or whole organizations (Pentland, 1999), and 
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causal attributions can be made at these different levels. The inherent ambiguity and 
complexity of business events creates the possibility of contestable attributional frames – 
i.e. situations where attributional frames are open to interpretation as multiple frames are 
available (Chong & Druckman, 2007), and multiple social actors can serve as focal actors 
for media narratives about these events. Specifically, two of modern society’s main 
journalistic frames used to explain business events are: leadership and organizational 
factors (Schein, 1985). Table 1.11 reports extracts of Bloomberg BusinessWeek articles to 
exemplify how similar business events can be reported using different narrative sequence 
of events and attributional frames. 
Third, an affective frame regards the affective attributes used within a media 
narrative (McCombs et al., 1997). The media convey not only facts but also feeling and 
tone that serve to shape the public interpretation of those facts (McCombs, 1992; 
Patterson, 1993). Following the definition of celebrity as social actors that attract high 
levels of public attention that is also positively emotionally charged, I am specifically 
interested in positive affective frames and their combination with cognitive frames for the 
development of individual and organizational celebrity.  
Overall, how the media select and combine these frames is important in 
determining the development of the different dramatized realities about business events 
which, in turn, lead to individual and/or organizational celebrity. Specifically, celebrity 
emerges for the focal actor to which the media attributes the sequence of events in the 




1 Tables and Figures are reported in Appendix 1 at the end of Chapter 1. 
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narration (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006), when the affective frames used are 
positive. Therefore, to understand how celebrity emerges at different organizational 
levels, we need to understand how social actors are selected as the ‘focal actor’ in the 
attributional frame.  
There are three possible outcomes of this framing contest in the development of 
media narratives: individual, organizational or convergent celebrity (see Figure 1.1). 
Individual celebrity emerges when media narratives are centered on an individual 
as the focal actor of the attributional frame in the story. Therefore, individual celebrity 
emerges when media narratives are dominated by individual-level attributional frames to 
explain business events. Rather than viewing the individual and the organization as 
complementary elements of the narrative, the media tend to perceive the individual as 
central to the story, to such an extent that the attention focuses mostly at the individual 
level and the organization may become peripheral to the story. For example, the media 
may tend to explain a firm’s actions and success by the behaviors and characteristics of a 
specific individual within the organization (Hayward et al., 2004) – usually the CEO or 
the entrepreneur/founder.  
Organizational celebrity emerges when media narratives are centered on the 
organization as the focal actor of the attributional frame in the story. Rather than viewing 
the individual and the organization as complementary elements of the narrative, in this 
case, the media perceives the organization as central to the story, and actions of 
individuals are either missing from the story or given supporting roles. Consequently, 
most attention is placed on the organization as a whole, rather than on any individual 
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within it. For example, the media may explain industry or business events by identifying 
specific firms within the industry that can serve the need for causal attribution and be 
identified as the agents of change (Rindova et al., 2006). 
Convergent celebrity emerges when media narratives are dominated by both 
individual- and organizational-level attributional frames. In these situations, the 
organization and the individual are viewed as complementary elements, each one plying 
significant and relevant roles in the story. Therefore, in convergent celebrity significant 
attention is placed at both levels. For example: 
“The office building on Facebook Way is in the unfinished style that honors 
materials like plywood, concrete, and steel. The I-beams supporting its soaring walls still 
have the builders’ chalk placement instructions on them. It takes a business making 
billions of high-margin dollars to make plywood and concrete seem so appealing. The 
merely ordinary have to put up drywall. […] Then, at the center, standing at his desk 
announcing something to a colleague, there’s Zuckerberg. He’s a great stander; he has 
terrific posture. […] If you spray-painted Zuckerberg a high-gloss white and told him to 
gaze off into the distance, he’d look exactly like a 1st century A.D. bust of Tiberius at the 
Capitoline Museum in Rome. Zuckerberg would get the reference. A scholar of the 
classics, he named his daughter Maxima, after the Roman, not the Nissan […]. 
Zuckerberg doesn’t wear a toga, unfortunately, but like any icon, he has a signature 
look—gray T-shirt, jeans, and sneakers.” (Urstadt & Frier, 2016). 
As highlighted in this example, both the individual and the organization are main 
characters in the story and each social actor is instrumental to the creation of a 
dramatized reality. 
In the next section of the paper, I focus on understanding the factors affecting the 
adoption of individual or organizational attributional frames, which in turn foster the 
emergence of individual, organizational or convergent celebrity. Specifically, I focus on 
the relative availability of these attributional frames and investigate factors that affect 




Frames are interpretative schemas used for both comprehending and presenting 
reality (Scheufele, 1999). Research on framing can be found in social and cognitive 
science, as well as in the political science and the communication fields. As a result of 
such widespread use across multiple disciplines, multiple definitions have been adopted 
in the literature. When focusing on their role in communication, researchers have referred 
to ‘frames’ as “the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker uses 
when relaying information to another, or what can be called frames in communication” 
(Druckman, 2001: 227).  
Framing should be interpreted as a diachronic process where, in their choice of 
journalistic frames, journalists are bounded by the cultural stock of schemas commonly 
found in a society which records the traces of past framing (Entman et al., 2009). When 
business events occur that are newsworthy, commentaries about them draw on culturally 
available ideas and symbols that are organized and clustered into causal frames.  
Not all frames are equally potent. Certain frames have a natural advantage 
because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1994). In general, resonance increases the appeal of a frame as it makes a 
frame appear natural and familiar. Specifically, resonance not only increases the 
likelihood of the frame’s adoption by journalists, but also increases its effect on the 




Three factors that affect the resonance of individual, organizational or convergent 
attributional frames and thereby influence the emergence of celebrity: i) organizational 
cultural repertoire, ii) an individual’s identification processes with an organization, and 
iii) the media’s choice of other cognitive frames. Specifically, the first two are important 
as they affect the content of communication materials available to the media for 
developing their news reports. I proceed by delineating how these actors affect the 
development of celebrity at different organizational levels.  
Organizational Communication 
Previous studies on celebrity have identified the important role played by 
organizational communication materials in building the media agenda (Blyskal & 
Blyskal, 1985; Rindova et al., 2006). Public relations activities are considered very 
important in influencing the media agenda, and research has shown that they can have a 
great influence on media content (Cameron, Sallot, & Curtin, 1997; Kiousis, Mitrook, 
Wu, & Seltzer, 2006; Lee & Solomon, 1990; Sallot & Johnson, 2006). Using press 
conferences, news releases, interviews and other communication tools, public relations 
professionals provide information subsidies to journalists to affect the construction of the 
media agenda (Kiousis et al., 2006). By providing these information subsidies, public 
relations practitioners reduce the time needed by journalists to report about a specific 
event, and the press often uses the least costly and most readily available sources of 
information (Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001). In the context of IPOs, Pollock and 
colleagues found a strong correlation of .42 between the volume of press releases and the 
volume of media coverage (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Also, studying corporate 
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takeovers, Ohl and colleagues found that organizational press releases influence the 
media agenda not only in terms of frequency of coverage but also in terms of the specific 
interpretations conveyed (Ohl, Pincus, Rimmer, & Harrison, 1995). It follows that 
organizations and their members can not only influence what topics are covered in the 
media, but also how they are framed in the media agenda. “In developing programs, 
public relations professionals fundamentally operate as frame strategists, who strive to 
determine how situations, attributes, choices, actions, issues and responsibility should be 
posed to achieve favorable objectives” (Hallahan, 1999: 224). Overall, journalists tend to 
make large use of wire agencies and editors are reluctant to significantly change wire 
content (Atwater, Fico, & Pizante, 1987).  
In summary, organizations and their members can exert their agency in the 
development of media narratives about organizational life, by providing idiosyncratic 
information about the CEO persona, organizational actions, and organizational culture. In 
doing so, they provide the media with the information needed for the development of the 
dramatized realities that are the core of the development of individual, organizational or 
convergent celebrity (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Indeed, by framing 
organizational communication materials at specific levels, managers and communication 
professionals can increase the resonance and accessibility (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) of 
those frames in the mind of journalists, affecting the production of media narratives. 
However, previous literature has not directly investigated why organizational 
communication materials may be focused at the individual or organizational level.  
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I suggest that an individual’s organizational identification processes with the 
organization and organizational cultural repertoire are two important factors affecting the 
frames adopted in organizational communication materials, and therefore affect the 
development of individual, organizational or convergent celebrity. I theorize about these 
factors in the remaining of this section.  
Individual Identification with the Organization. Social identity theory suggests 
that individuals define themselves partly on the basis of their affiliation with different 
social groups (e.g. their organization, their profession, their family, etc.), and that not all 
of these affiliations contribute equally to one’s definition of oneself (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Organizational identification refers to a “cognitive linking 
between the definition of the organization and the definition of self” (Dutton et al., 1994: 
242). Strong organizational identification indicates that the individual considers the 
organizational identity – i.e. what an organization’s members perceive as the central, 
distinctive and enduring values and goals of the organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985) – 
worthy and integrates it into his/her own sense of self. For organizational identification to 
arise, the individual must perceive the organizational identity as salient and he/she must 
self-categorize in terms of his/her membership in the organization (Pratt, 1998). It 
follows that different organizational members may differ in their level of reliance on the 
organization as an identity-defining social group.  
In general, therefore, organizational identification refers to “perception of oneness 
with” an organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989: 21; Galvin, Lange, & Ashforth, 2015). 
Theory on organizational identification has identified multiple types of identifications 
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based on the level of convergence of the individual and organizational identity (Galvin et 
al., 2015). First, conventional identification implies both internalization – i.e. 
incorporating aspects of an organization’s identity into one’s sense of self – and 
externalization – i.e. incorporating aspects of oneself into one’s perception of the 
organization’s identity (Galvin et al., 2015). Strong conventional organizational 
identification occurs when the organizational member’s own identity and his/her 
perception of the organization’s identity overlay completely so that the organization is 
central to the individual’s definition of self (Galvin et al., 2015). Nevertheless, the 
individual maintains a sense of self independent from the organization so that the 
individual identity is not subsumed by the organization’s identity (Galvin et al., 2015).  
Second, over-identification occurs when extreme internalization is not 
compensated by externalization. In these situations, the individual’s identity is lost within 
his/her perception of the organization’s identity (Dukerich, Kramer, & Parks, 1998). The 
organizational member sees him/herself as an expression of the organization’s identity, 
instead of using it as a reference point to help define his/her individual identity (Galvin et 
al., 2015).  
Third, narcissistic organizational identification occurs when extreme levels of 
externalization are not compensated by internalization (Galvin et al., 2015). In these 
situations, the individual identity dominates, and the organizational member perceives the 
organization as an expression of him/herself. The individual conceives the organization in 
terms of self and his/her own identity becomes the fundamental point of reference for 
understanding the organization’s identity (Galvin et al., 2015). 
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How an individual identifies with his/her organization affects his/her provision of 
information to external stakeholders and to the media in particular (Chatterjee & Pollock, 
2016). When the individual has strong influence on organizational decision making 
process, communication activities and overall strategic processes (as in the case of a CEO 
or founder), his/her identification processes is likely to strongly affect the type of 
information provided and used by the media. Specifically, I theorize that individuals with 
strong levels of narcissistic organizational identification, will more likely provide the 
media with idiosyncratic information about themselves (Rindova et al., 2006), and 
engage in ingratiatory (Westphal & Deephouse, 2011) and symbolic (Bednar, 2012) 
behaviors towards journalists (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016). This will foster the 
development of media narratives framed at the individual level. On the other hand, I 
theorize that individuals that strongly over-identify with the organization will more likely 
provide the media with information about the organization as a whole, rather than about 
themselves, fostering the development of media narratives framed at the organizational 
level. Lastly, individuals that have strong conventional organizational identification will 
more likely provide the media with information about themselves and the organization, 
fostering the development of media narratives framed at both the individual and 
organizational levels.  
To summarize, different types of identification with one’s organization will foster 
the adoption of different attributional frames in the communication materials to the 
media, affecting the resonance of such frames, and consequently the likelihood of their 
adoption. Ultimately, by providing information framed at different levels, individuals 
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within organizations can affect the adoption of a specific frame-level in media narratives. 
Stated formally: 
Proposition 1: The likelihood of adoption of individual/organizational level 
frames in media coverage of business events is related to an individual’s identification 
processes with the organization. 
a) Narcissistic organizational identification increases the likelihood of adoption of 
individual-level frames. 
b) Over-identification with the organization increases the likelihood of adoption of 
organizational-level frames. 
c) Conventional organizational identification increases the likelihood of adoption of 
convergent frames. 
Organizational Cultural Repertoire. Organizational culture has been defined as a 
system of collectively accepted and interconnected taken-for-granted beliefs and values 
that are manifested in idiosyncratic patterns of thought, speech, and behavior in a given 
organizational environment at a given time (Barley, 1983; Canato, Ravasi, & Phillips, 
2013; Martin, 2002; Pettigrew, 1979). In his original work on culture, Schein (1985) 
conceptualized it as existing simultaneously on three levels: basic assumptions – i.e. 
taken-for-granted beliefs – values – i.e. social principles, aims and norms considered to 
have intrinsic worth – and artifacts – i.e. the tangible outcomes of activities grounded in 
values and assumptions (Hatch, 1993). Early research focused on the deep level of 
assumptions that unknowingly shape action and, therefore, culture was conceived as a 
constraint (Canato et al., 2013). Recent research has focused on culture as a toolkit 
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(Swidler, 1986) of resources that are employed to attain different goals (Rindova, 
Dalpiaz, & Ravasi, 2011). These toolkits of cultural resources include things such as 
symbols, language, stories, narratives, rituals and myths (Rindova et al., 2011; Swidler, 
1986) that together form an organizational cultural repertoire – i.e. those resources that an 
organization has selected from the broader industry and societal cultural toolkits 
(Rindova et al., 2011).  
Organizational cultural resources such as narratives, rituals, and myths, express 
and reinforce what is valued within an organization (Pettigrew, 1979). First, I theorize 
that when specific individuals are at the center of the cultural resources forming an 
organizational repertoire, organizational communication materials will more likely be 
focused at the individual level, fostering the adoption of individual-level frames in media 
coverage of business events about that organization. For example, the more the CEO is at 
the center of organizational rituals, myths and narratives, the more organizational 
communication materials to the media will also be focused at the individual level 
fostering the adoption of individual-level frames in media narratives about business 
events regarding the organization. Second, I theorize that when the organization as a 
whole is at the center of the resources forming its cultural repertoire, organizational 
communication materials will more likely be focused at the organizational level, fostering 
the adoption of organizational-level frames in media coverage of business events about 
the organization. Lastly, I theorize that when an organization’s cultural repertoire 
encompasses both individual- and organizational-level narratives, myths, and rituals, 
organizational communication materials will be balanced in presenting both individual- 
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and organizational-level frames, fostering the adoption of convergent frames in media 
coverage of business events about the organization. Stated formally:  
Proposition 2: The likelihood of adoption of individual, organizational or 
convergent frames in media coverage business events is related to an organization’s 
cultural repertoire. 
a) An organizational cultural repertoire strongly focused on specific individuals 
within an organization increases the likelihood of adoption of individual-level frames. 
b) An organizational cultural repertoire strongly focused on the organization as a 
whole increases the likelihood of adoption of organizational-level frames. 
c) An organizational cultural repertoire that balances attention to individuals within 
an organization and the organization as a whole increases the likelihood of adoption of 
convergent frames. 
Frame Packages 
As previously discussed, media play a central role in determining the emergence 
of different types of celebrity by developing dramatized narratives about business events 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). They do this by selecting cognitive and 
affective frames and combining them into narratives which dramatize realities about 
business events. Causal explanations are often embedded in these narratives, to render 
these events “coherent and comprehensible” for the audiences (Rindova et al., 2006: 56). 
In developing such causal attributions, journalists propose a certain interpretation of 
reality, and cast individuals or organizations as celebrities by putting them at the center of 
their narratives (i.e. by selecting them as focal actor/s in the narrative text). 
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When inferring causal explanations, properties of a cause are generally assumed 
to be comparable to analogous properties of the effect (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Shultz & 
Ravinsky, 1977), since a certain degree of comparability between effect and cause is 
expected. This ‘similarity principle’ has been applied to a number of different properties 
– e.g. the assumption that a good behavior effect must have been caused by a good person 
(Kelley, 1973) – but relevant to my theory development is its application to intensity as a 
relevant property in determining causal attributions. When inferring causal attributions, 
the intensity of the effect is assumed to vary proportionately with the intensity of its 
cause (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Shultz & Ravinsky, 1977). Thus, the rule of similarity 
suggests that the intensity of an event affects the types of causal attributions made by 
observers, in that an event will be more likely attributed to a cause that is perceived to 
have an adequate (i.e. similar) intensity. Consequently, a more complex set of media 
stories will increase the resonance and consequently the adoption of a more complex set 
of focal actor/s to explain those events.  
Following this reasoning, I theorize that individual attributional frames (i.e. an 
individual as the focal actor in the narrative text) will be more likely combined with an 
organizational-level sequence of events frame. Leadership is widely construed as a causal 
explanation for organizational actions and outcomes (Meindl et al., 1985) and over time 
the concept of leadership has become firmly rooted in the collective understanding of 
organizational life (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). This romance of leadership “can be 
construed as an assumption, preconception, or bias that interested observers and 
participants bring to bear when they must find an intellectually compelling and 
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emotionally satisfying comprehension of the causes, nature, and consequences of 
organizational activities” (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987: 92). Thus, individual attributions are 
likely to resonate more when journalists write organizational-level stories, as they will be 
deemed more intensity-appropriate. 
Also, I theorize that organizational attributional frames (i.e. an organization as the 
focal actor in the narrative text) will be more likely combined with an industry-level 
sequence of events frame. When writing stories about industry changes, the media are 
more inclined to adopt organizational attributions as such explanations are deemed more 
intensity-appropriate, and therefore will become more resonant. Given the nature of the 
story, specific expectations and suppositions about the cause will emerge. I expect that 
journalists’ causal schemata will foster the choice of more intense and complex sets of 
causes when writing stories about industry-level change events. For example, research 
shows that individual success on simple tasks can be explained in terms of ability or 
effort (Kelley & Michela, 1980). On the other hand, individual success on complex tasks 
requires the use of both criteria (Kelley & Michela, 1980). Given their complexity, stories 
framed as industry-level sequence of events will require the use of more complex 
explanatory systems, above and beyond leadership. In these situations, organizational 
attributions represent a valid alternative to leadership explanations, as they represent a 
more complex system of interrelated causes, and may be deemed more intensity-
appropriate. 
Following similar logic, I theorize that both individual and organizational 
attributional frames are used in stories framed as societal-level sequence of events, as the 
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complexity of these stories calls for even more complex systems of causes than either 
individual- or organizational-level attributions can provide. Consequently, when 
journalists write narratives framed as societal-level events, convergent attributions 
(individual and organizational) will become more resonant as they represent a more 
complex system of interrelated causes, and may be deemed more intensity-appropriate. 
Stated formally:  
Proposition 3: The likelihood of adoption of individual, organizational or 
convergent attributional frames in media coverage of business events is related to the 
complexity of the story being narrated.  
a) Individual-level frames are more likely adopted in stories on organizational 
change. 
b) Organizational-level frames are more likely adopted in stories on industry 
change. 
c) Convergent frames are more likely adopted in stories on societal change. 
Frames Evolution 
Individual and organizational celebrity are highly interdependent and oftentimes, 
celebrity individuals such as CEOs or entrepreneurs may be involved in an organization’s 
celebrity development process (Rindova et al., 2006) and vice versa. Yet, research thus 
far has not addressed this issue and, adopting a mostly static approach to the study of this 
phenomenon, disregards how multi-level celebrity dynamics unfold over time. 
Addressing this issue, I now focus on understanding how and why frames in media 
narratives may change over time fostering a shift across the three forms of media 
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coverage represented in Figure 1.1 (i.e. individual, organizational, and convergent 
celebrity).  
Since the choice of frames in media narratives is not static, I theorize that changes 
in the factors previously identified as affecting the resonance of individual and 
organizational frames, may foster two evolution patterns can occur: cooperative 
dynamics and competitive dynamics. Cooperative dynamics occur when from individual 
or organizational celebrity there is a shift towards convergent celebrity. In these 
situations, individual and organizational frames support each other in the development of 
both social approval assets. Competitive dynamics occur when, from convergent 
celebrity, there is a shift towards individual or organizational celebrity. In these 
situations, the frames seem to compete, rather than cooperate in the 
development/maintenance of both social approval assets.  
First, in the previous section, I suggested that how an individual identifies with 
his/her organization affects his/her provision of information to external stakeholders and 
to the media in particular (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016), fostering the adoption of different 
attributional frames. Nevertheless, identification processes may change over time. First, 
such changes are likely to occur following turnover events. Nevertheless, they can also 
occur following events that trigger an individual’s need to preserve or enhance his/her 
perception of their social identity. Social identity theory suggests that individuals use 
cognitive tactics such as selective self-categorization (Turner, 1987) to preserve or 
enhance positive perceptions of their social identity (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988). I expect that following, turnover, identity-threatening (Elsbach & 
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Kramer, 1996) or identity-enhancing events, individuals’ organizational identifications 
may change over time. This will affect the provision of information to external 
stakeholders, and thus foster shifts across different types of celebrity.   
Specifically, I theorize that changes in such identification processes will foster the 
development of different types of celebrity dynamics. When individuals’ identification 
process shifts from either strong narcissistic identification or strong over-identification 
towards strong conventional identification, this will affect his/her provision of 
information to the media, and increase the likelihood of celebrity cooperative dynamics, 
facilitating a shift from individual or organizational celebrity towards convergent 
celebrity. On the other hand, when the individual identification process shifts from either 
strong conventional identification towards strong narcissistic or over-identification, this 
will affect his/her provision of information to the media, and increase the likelihood of 
celebrity competitive dynamics, facilitating a shift from convergent celebrity towards 
individual or organizational celebrity.  
Proposition 4: The development of celebrity dynamics is related to changes in the 
individual’s identification processes with the organization: 
a) A change from either strong narcissistic or strong over-identification processes to 
strong conventional identification will increase the likelihood of cooperative dynamics to 
develop over time.  
b) A change from strong conventional identification to either strong narcissistic or 
strong over-identification processes will increase the likelihood of competitive dynamics 
to develop over time. 
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Second, in the previous section, I identified organizational cultural repertoire as 
an important factor in the adoption of different attributional frames. Specifically, I 
theorized that cultural resources within an organization such as stories, symbols, rituals 
and myths will affect the content of the communication materials to the media and thus 
affect the development of celebrity. An organizational cultural repertoire, however, may 
change over time as it is affected by an organization’s external environment (Rindova et 
al., 2011). Consequently, changes in an industry’s cultural registry (Weber, 2005) foster 
changes in the cultural resources of an organization. Following these dynamics, I expect 
that changes in organizational cultural repertoires will foster shifts across different types 
of celebrity. Specifically, I theorize that when an organizational cultural repertoire shifts 
from one that is strongly focused on either specific individuals or the organization as a 
whole to a more balanced one, this will affect organizational communication materials, 
and will increase the likelihood of the media to engage in cooperative dynamics fostering 
the development of convergent celebrity. On the other hand, when an organizational 
cultural repertoire shifts from one that is balanced towards one that is strongly focused on 
either specific individuals or the organization as a whole, this will affect organizational 
communication materials, and increase the likelihood of the media to engage in 
competitive dynamics fostering the development of convergent celebrity. Stated formally:  
Proposition 5: The development of celebrity dynamics is related to changes in an 
organization’s cultural repertoire: 
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a) A change in an organization’s cultural repertoire from either strong individual 
focus or strong organizational focus towards a balanced focus will increase the 
likelihood of cooperative dynamics to develop over time.  
b) A change in an organization’s cultural repertoire from a balanced focus to either 
strong individual focus or strong organizational focus will increase the likelihood of 
competitive dynamics to develop over time.  
Third, in the previous section, I suggested that the adoption of attributional frame 
is affected by the other frames adopted by journalists within the same stories. 
Specifically, I focused on how the choice regarding the level of sequence of events 
affects the choice of attributional frames, following the rule of similarity criteria. 
Nevertheless, the media compete for public attention by creating the dramatized realities 
that cognitively and emotionally engage the public (Rindova et al., 2006). Given this 
need, journalists often use novelty as necessary to engage the audience with the 
representation of a dramatized reality, as the unfamiliar attracts attention (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988). To introduce novelty in their media coverage about an organization, the 
media can adopt a diverse set of cognitive frames. For this reason, over time, 
organizational-level sequence of events may be combined or replaced with industry or 
societal ones and vice versa, leading to the adoption of different attributional frames and 
the development of different types of celebrity. I theorize that changes over time in the 
choice of frame in terms of sequence of events will foster changes in the attributional 
frames adopted in media narratives. Cooperative dynamics are likely to occur when 
media narratives shift from organizational- or industry-level frames of the sequence of 
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events towards societal ones. Over time, this will foster the development of convergent 
celebrity. On the other hand, competitive dynamics are likely to occur when media 
narratives shift from societal-level frames of the sequence of events towards 
organizational or industry ones. Over time, this will foster the development of individual 
or organizational celebrity respectively. Stated formally: 
Proposition 6: The development of celebrity dynamics is related to changes in the 
cognitive frames used in media narratives: 
a) A change in the level of the sequence of events frame from either strong 
organizational focus or strong industry focus towards a societal focus will increase the 
likelihood of cooperative dynamics to develop over time.  
b) A change in the level of the sequence of events frame from a societal focus 
towards either strong organizational focus or strong industry focus will increase the 
likelihood of competitive dynamics to develop over time.  
Performance Implications 
Previous literature has investigated the performance implications of individual 
and organizational celebrity separately (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006), and in 
doing so, it fails to provide an understanding of the consequences of these two constructs 
when occurring together. I suggest that specific performance advantages and 
disadvantages may arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity when compared 
to the possession of either one. I discuss such implications as they are important in 
providing insights into the complex ways in which different social approval assets 
contribute to the determination of organizational performance.  
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First, theory on individual and organizational celebrity suggests that by increasing 
economic opportunities for an organization, these important social approval assets have 
the potential to generate value for the organization (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 
2006). However, when celebrity is at the individual level, it can generate hubris and 
overconfidence and this, over time, may lead to biased decision making processes 
(Hayward et al., 2004). When celebrity individuals share celebrity with the organization, 
such biases may be reduced as organizational-level attributions are combined with 
individual ones by organizational constituents to explain organizational actions and 
success, mitigating the attributions made at the individual level.  
Second, individual celebrity is highly mobile across organizations as individuals 
can change organizations. Once a celebrity individual leaves, so may the economic 
opportunities associated with his/her celebrity. Also, previous research has shown that 
when a new non-celebrity-CEO is appointed following a celebrity one, he/she is likely to 
experience less favorable evaluations due to the use of contrast heuristics (Graffin, 
Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013a). The combination of individual and organizational celebrity 
may reduce some of these risks. When a celebrity CEO leaves a celebrity organization, 
the economic opportunities associated with organizational celebrity are not lost. Also, it 
may be the case that a celebrity organization will more likely be able to attract a new 
celebrity CEO.  
Third, both organizational and individual celebrity heighten not only the attention 
that organizational constituents pay to an organization, but their expectations as well 
(Graffin, Pfarrer, & Hill, 2012a). With increased attention, therefore, heightened scrutiny 
42 
 
may also be expected when the organization either fails to meet the high expectations it 
has generated, or is involved in negative events. It follows that the presence of the asset at 
the other level may increase the speed at which economic opportunities are lost. 
Fourth, research at the organizational level has shown that celebrity may foster 
members’ alignment around a new understanding of what the organization is, but over 
time, it may also impede further identity work among organizational members, as the 
image projected in the media is too appealing to be challenged by the actual reality 
experienced within the organization (Kjærgaard et al., 2011). I suggest that, when a 
celebrity CEO – that has developed hubris and has become overcommitted to the 
strategic actions undertaken by the organization – leads a celebrity organization, the 
concomitant presence of this social approval asset at both organizational level will 
increase the risk of organizational identity captivation and reduce the ability of the 
organization to implement change when needed.  
To conclude, specific performance advantages and disadvantages may arise from 
the possession of both levels of celebrity when compared to the possession of either one. 
I did not develop formal propositions about such performance implications given that the 
theoretical focus was on the development and co-evolution processes of these two 
distinctive, yet highly interrelated, social approval assets. 
Discussion 
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications 
Celebrity is a common phenomenon in modern society (Gamson, 1992; Rindova 
et al., 2006) and has become an important aspect characterizing how organizations and 
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their members are perceived by stakeholders and constituents. Within the context of 
organizational studies, celebrity has been investigated at the individual – e.g. CEOs and 
entrepreneurs – and organizational levels – e.g. Apple and Tesla. Being in the media 
spotlight, these social actors become celebrities known and acclaimed by audiences, 
within and beyond the boundaries of their industries.  
Emerging from previous literature on celebrity is an initial appreciation of how 
individual and organizational celebrity are achieved, and a preliminary understanding of 
their distinctive effects on organizational outcomes. However, research on these 
constructs has largely proceeded independently, despite suggestions the two may be 
interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006). This has hampered our understanding of how 
celebrity develops at one level or the other, how celebrity at different levels co-evolves 
over time, and what are the performance implications of achieving celebrity across 
multiple organizational levels. I addressed these limitations of the current literature on 
organizational celebrity and provide multiple theoretical contributions.  
First, I contribute to theory on celebrity by identifying factors affecting the 
development of celebrity at different organizational levels. I suggest that celebrity 
development at different organizational levels is affected by the resonance of individual 
or organizational attributional frames. In doing so, I highlight how celebrity is developed 
through a co-creation process where multiple social actors are involved (i.e. journalists, 
organizations and organizational members), and move the theory a step further in 
understanding why and how celebrity emerges at different organizational levels. This is 
important since previous literature has shown that individual and organizational celebrity 
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has different implications on organizational outcomes. Second, I contribute to theory on 
celebrity by developing a theoretical model that addresses how individual and 
organizational celebrity co-evolve over time. Oftentimes, celebrity individuals such as 
CEOs or entrepreneurs are involved in an organization’s celebrity development process 
(Rindova et al., 2006) and vice versa. Yet, research thus far has not addressed this issue. I 
suggest that changes i) in the frames packages within media reporting, ii) in the 
organizational culture, and iii) in the identification processes the individual engages in, 
will affect the development of cooperative or competitive celebrity dynamics. Third, I 
contribute to theory on celebrity by discussing the potential performance implications of 
these two constructs when occurring together. I suggest that specific performance 
advantages and disadvantages may arise from the possession of both levels of celebrity 
when compared to the possession of either one. By investigating the organizational 
implications of individual and organizational celebrity, I contribute to the strategic 
management literature by theorizing about the relationship between a combination of 
social approval assets and organizational competitive advantage. 
Overall, the media affect organizational actions and performance by impacting the 
prominence and perceptions of organizations and their members in the public mind. 
Knowing how media coverage of business events comes about is the first step for 
managing it. To this extent, the theoretical model developed here bares important 
practical implications, as it lends understanding of under what circumstances the media 
adopt an organizational and/or an individual frame. Given that these social approval 
assets have been shown to have different effects on organizational outcomes, 
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organizations experiencing high levels of media coverage framed at the individual level 
should consider taking actions to increase the resonance of organizational attributional 
frames. Therefore, attention should be given to monitor the type of media coverage that 
an organization and its members receive so that specific actions can be taken to foster the 
adoption of specific attributional frames. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
There are limitations and boundary conditions inherent in my theorizing that 
provide avenues for future research. First, I focus on business events that are already 
salient to journalists as they represent a change from either organizational practices or 
industry and societal norms. Such events are the ones that will more likely activate the 
mechanism behind media attention. In doing so, I do not address the question of why the 
media decide to focus attention on a specific set of business events to be narrated, but 
rather focus on the choice of attributional frames after that decision is made. An 
underlying characteristic of the business event, necessary for the development of both 
organizational and individual celebrity, is the obtrusiveness of the event itself (Rindova et 
al., 2006). Journalists are more likely to focus attention on change events – i.e. empirical 
observations of difference in form, quality or state over time within an entity (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 1995) – rather than reporting on the status quo (Rindova et al., 2006). 
Given the specific purpose of this paper, I only focus on how a specific frame is chosen 
over others, and assume that the frame is being applied to an event that has already 
attracted media attention. 
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Second, I only focus on business events that are perceived as positive, as they are 
likely to elicit positive emotional responses from the audience and, consequently, 
generate celebrity. Interestingly, the development process of causal attributions about 
positive events may differ greatly from the development process of causal attributions 
about negative events (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Rindova et al., 2006). To this extent, future 
research is needed to understand how the model proposed in this essay would apply to the 
development of individual and organizational infamy.  
Third, I only discuss potential performance implications of the concomitant 
occurrence of individual and organizational celebrity. I suggest that specific advantages 
and disadvantages may be expected when celebrity occurs at both the individual and 
organizational levels. Yet, I do not formally develop propositions about the relationship 
between the possession of convergent celebrity and organizational performance, because 
the theoretical focus is on the development and co-evolution of different levels of 
celebrity. Future theorizing and empirical research is needed to address the 
organizational-level implications of different levels of celebrity 
Conclusion 
Often CEOs and entrepreneurs or entire organizations become celebrities known 
and acclaimed by audiences within and beyond the boundaries of their industries. 
Increased attention has been devoted to individual and organizational celebrity in the 
context of organizational studies. In this essay, I have focused on understanding how and 
why celebrity emerges at different organizational levels and how individual and 
organizational celebrity co-evolve over time. I expect that the theory developed here will 
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increase our understanding of this important social approval asset and stimulate further 
research on the relationship between individual and organizational celebrity and their 








Event - Frame 
Attributional 
Frame 
“Down the road, Jobs has an even bigger 
event planned. Rather than build a future 
solely around Apple's 13-year-old 
Macintosh computer, Jobs is expected to 
bet the orchard on the nascent market for 
so-called network computers, […]. 
Engineers are working overtime on a 
sleek new design for a "MacNC," 







“For the past couple of decades, using 
remote controls to move little arrows and 
click on strange symbols was a natural 
way to control computers and other 
electronic devices. Then along came the 
iPhone, and suddenly dragging objects 
around with a fingertip and making 
things grow or shrink with a gesture 
made mice and icons seem so 20th 




“Business writers, like romance 
novelists, love hyperbole. The paradigm 
will shift. The good will be great. The 
earth will move. But occasionally a new 
technology comes along that really does 
help society. Apple's tablet may just be 
such a device. […] No one beats Steve 
Jobs at making radical new hardware 













2. CHAPTER II - 
CEO AND ORGANIZATIONAL CELEBRITY: INVESTIGATING 





CEO and organizational celebrity have been identified as two important social 
approval assets that have relevant, yet different, effects on organizational decision 
making processes and performance (Rindova et al., 2006). This fertile body of research, 
however, has mostly focused empirical efforts on investigating the consequences of 
celebrity at different levels. Few empirical studies have investigated how celebrity is 
achieved and how it may emerge at different organizational levels. This essay specifically 
addresses this gap by investigating the factors that affect the adoption by the media of the 
individual or organizational attributional frames that foster the creation of CEO and 
organizational celebrity. Building on previous work on CEO (Hayward et al., 2004) and 
organizational celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006), and integrating attribution (Kelley, 1973), 
and framing theory (Entman, 1993), I develop predictions on the factors that affect the 
likelihood of CEO and organizational celebrity to emerge. I test the hypotheses on a 
sample of 244 firms from the Fortune 500 and Unicorn lists over 15 years. The results of 
show that the more the positive competitive actions undertaken by a company, the more 
likely is the emergence of organizational celebrity, but not CEO celebrity. However, 
contrary to current theory, the distinctiveness of those competitive actions does not 
increase their efficacy in affecting the emergence of celebrity at either level. 
Nevertheless, the frequency and distinctiveness of competitive actions become important 
in determining celebrity when individual or organizational attributional frames are made 
more salient through other information subsides, such as the presence of founder-CEO or 
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the frames promoted in organizational communication materials. The results have 
important theoretical, methodological and practical implications 
Introduction 
Celebrities are social actors that attract high levels of public attention, and elicit 
positive emotional responses from the public (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Rindova et al., 
2006), through the mediating role of media (Boorstin, 1961; Hayward et al., 2004; Rojek, 
2004). Being an important phenomenon in modern society, the construct has attracted 
attention across multiple disciplines (e.g. Austin et al., 2008; Hayward et al., 2004; 
McCracken, 1989; Van de Rijt et al., 2013) and multiple levels of investigation.  
Specifically, the choice of the focal level of analysis when studying celebrity has 
influenced most of the research on this construct within organizational studies. On the 
one hand, some scholars have focused attention at the individual level, addressing 
questions about celebrity CEOs, founders, and other prominent individuals within 
organizations (Hayward et al., 2004; Ketchen et al., 2008; Ranft et al., 2007; Wade et al., 
2006, 2008). On the other hand, following the work of Rindova and colleagues on 
celebrity firms (Rindova et al., 2006), other scholars have applied the concept at the 
organizational level, examining the factors that build organizational celebrity and its 
consequences for organizational performance (see Kjærgaard et al., 2011; Perryman, 
2008; Pfarrer et al., 2010).  
Overall, CEO and organizational celebrity have been identified as two important 
social approval assets that have relevant, yet different, effects on organizational decision 
making processes and performance (Rindova et al., 2006). Specifically, empirical 
53 
 
evidence shows that the positive effects of CEO celebrity on organizational performance 
tend to be short lived (Wade et al., 2006), and in the long term, this social approval asset 
may be detrimental to the organization (Wade et al., 2006). On the other hand, celebrity 
organizations receive greater market rewards when announcing positive earnings 
surprises, and smaller market penalties when announcing negative earnings surprises 
(Pfarrer et al., 2010). 
This fertile body of research, however, has mostly focused empirical efforts on 
investigating the consequences of celebrity at different levels. Few empirical studies have 
investigated how celebrity is achieved and how it may emerge at different organizational 
levels, and the theoretical efforts put forth to identify these processes need further 
empirical investigation. Moreover, research on organizational and CEO celebrity has 
proceeded largely independently, failing to address how and why this important social 
approval asset emerges at different organizational levels. This essay specifically 
addresses these gaps in the literature by investigating the factors that affect the adoption 
by the media of the individual or organizational attributional frames that foster the 
creation of CEO and organizational celebrity. This is important in consideration of the 
fact that CEO and organizational celebrity seem to have different effects on 
organizational outcomes, discussed above. 
Building on previous work on CEO (Hayward et al., 2004) and organizational 
celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006), and integrating attribution (Kelley, 1973), and framing 
theory (Entman, 1993), I develop predictions on factors that affect the likelihood of CEO 
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and organizational celebrity to emerge. I test hypotheses on a sample of 244 firms from 
the Fortune 500 and Unicorn lists over 15 years.  
The results have theoretical, methodological and practical implications. First, I 
identify different antecedents of organizational and CEO celebrity, suggesting that these 
social approval assets develop differently, and further theoretical development is needed 
to better understand these differences. Second, results show strategic and industry 
distinctiveness do not facilitate the emergence of celebrity at either level. This suggests 
that, contrary to current theory on business celebrity, the business media may be more 
prone to report about the status quo than previously thought. Third, from a 
methodological perspective, I develop equivalent measures of individual and 
organizational celebrity that are clearly distinct from measures used for operationalizing 
other social approval assets (such as reputation and status) and allow for more direct 
comparisons of celebrity across organizational levels. Lastly, from a practical standpoint, 
the results of this study show that a firm has agency in affecting organizational celebrity 
by framing its communication materials, particularly when the organization does not 
behave too distinctively and, therefore, maintains legitimacy among its constituents.  
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
Celebrity 
Generally speaking, a celebrity can be defined as a subject whose name has 
“attention-getting, interest-riveting, and profit-generating value” (Rein et al., 1987: 15), 
and there is large consensus on the fact that celebrities are well known social actors 
whose existence is inextricably related to the media (Boorstin, 1961; Hayward et al., 
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2004; Rojek, 2004). When fame becomes a commodity produced and consumed by the 
media, and the audience’s desire to gather information about the subject increases, 
celebrity arises (Guthey, Clark, & Jackson, 2009; Rojek, 2004).  
In the context of organizational studies, celebrity is conceptualized as an 
intangible resource within the category of social approval assets (Pfarrer et al., 2010; 
Rindova et al., 2006) and, as such, derives its value “from favorable collective 
perceptions” (Pfarrer et al., 2010: 1131) that foster stakeholders’ willingness to exchange 
resources with a firm (Rindova et al., 2006). Specifically, celebrities are defined as social 
actors that attract high levels of public attention and elicit positive emotional responses 
from their audiences through the mediating role of media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; 
Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016a).  
The first aspect of this definition deserves special attention because, in this essay, 
I focus on two specific categories of social actors: individuals (i.e. CEOs) and 
organizations. While the conceptualization of individuals as social actors is 
straightforward (King, Felin, & Whetten, 2010), the conceptualization of organizations as 
social actors deserves further discussion. Social actors are distinguished from other 
entities on the basis of the perception that other actors have about their ability to “make 
decisions, and behave of their own volition” (King et al., 2010: 292). Building on Staw’s 
(Staw, 1991) and Whetten and colleagues’ works (Whetten, Felin, & King, 2009), I adopt 
the idea that organizations can be “thought of as social actors, complete with motives, 
drivers and intentions” (Highhouse, Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009). Once constituted as 
such, organizations represent more than the aggregation of their members or the mere 
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representations of their environments. They behave in a purposeful manner and influence 
individuals, communities and environments (King et al., 2010). Moreover, organizations 
can be considered as social actors because their stakeholders and constituents (Zavyalova 
et al., 2016a) grant them this status legally, practically and linguistically (King et al., 
2010). The definition of organizations as social actors is an important component of this 
essay, as it is central to the nomological network of the organizational celebrity construct. 
The theory on organizational celebrity suggests that it arises as the media attribute 
industry or societal level change events to the volition of organizations that act 
distinctively within their industries or society in general (Rindova et al., 2006). 
Therefore, the organizational celebrity construct assumes that the media perceives and 
represents organizations as social actors. Indeed, for organizational celebrity to emerge, 
other social actors (the media) have to perceive the organization as a decision maker 
capable of acting with some degrees of intentionality (King et al., 2010).  
As previously mentioned, two different social actors have been the focus of most 
research on celebrity in this field: CEOs and organizations. I briefly review the literature 
on CEO and organizational celebrity in the following paragraphs.  
CEO Celebrity. Current theory on CEO celebrity suggests that it arises as the 
media attribute organizational actions and performance to the CEO (Hayward et al., 
2004). For example, the emergence of individual celebrity is related to media narratives 
like this extract from a Bloomberg BusinessWeek article: 
“While Jobs may still have some surprises up his sleeve, details are emerging that 
show he plans to recast Apple from industry has-been to something more akin to highflier 
Dell Computer Corp., the model PC maker of the future” (Burrows, 1997). 
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CEO celebrity, therefore, is an outcome of the process through which the media 
develop causal attributions at the individual level when reporting about business events 
(Hayward et al., 2004). However, theory suggests that in order for CEO celebrity to 
emerge, the organizational actions need to be distinctive (Hayward et al., 2004). When an 
organization takes distinctive actions, media attention is likely to increase as the 
organization becomes more salient (Fiske & Taylor, 2013; Hayward et al., 2004). Also, 
theory suggests that the likelihood that distinctive organizational actions will determine 
CEO celebrity is increased when the CEO is associated with similar actions across 
different contexts and circumstances (Hayward et al., 2004), as this will foster an 
attribution to the CEO’s volition. Lastly, attributions of organizational actions to the 
CEO’s volition are theorized to increase with the availability of information about a 
CEO’s idiosyncratic behaviors (Hayward et al., 2004). The greater the media access to 
information about the CEO persona, the more likely the emergence of CEO celebrity 
(Hayward et al., 2004).  
Empirical evidence shows that the media tend to overstate CEOs’ contributions to 
firm performance. Leadership is often used as a chief explanatory factor to explain 
organizational actions and success (Chen & Meindl, 1991; Meindl et al., 1985). Multiple 
factors explain this tendency. First, in their sense-making of organizational events, 
journalists are subjected to the fundamental attribution error – i.e. over-attributing a 
behavior to the volition of the actor’s dispositional qualities (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977). 
This general attribution phenomenon is due to the fact that individuals make causal 
attributions to predict the future (Heider, 1944, 1958), and in doing so they prefer to 
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explain events in terms of “stable factors, such as the disposition of an actor, rather than 
temporary ones, such as the characteristics of a situation” (Hayward et al., 2004: 638). 
Following this approach, journalists tend to use CEOs’ dispositions as brief and simple 
explanations for organizational actions and outcomes (Hayward et al., 2004). Second, 
journalists work under great time pressure (Tuchman, 1978) managing a significant 
amount of complex information and covering wide subject areas (Hayward et al., 2004) 
while often possessing generalist knowledge (Gitlin, 1980). Accordingly, they tend to 
adopt and rely on relatively simple and familiar explanations for organizational actions 
and performance that do not require excessive data collection and interpretation 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Kurtz, 2000; Rindova et al., 2006; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). 
These conditions exacerbate the fundamental attribution error, and foster the tendency of 
journalists to attribute organizational actions and outcomes to the CEO. Third, given that 
people appreciate leadership as a simple and appealing explanation of organizational 
actions (Staw & Sutton, 1992), media narratives centered on the CEO persona may be 
more appealing to the public, fostering the propensity of journalists to center their 
reporting about organizational events on the CEO (Hayward et al., 2004). In sum, due to 
motivational and cognitive factors, information-processing constraints, and work 
demands, journalists tend to interpret casually ambiguous organizational events using 
leadership explanations (Hayward et al., 2004; Meindl et al., 1985). 
When investigating the consequences of CEO celebrity, researchers sustain that, 
by fostering higher expectations among organizational stakeholders, there can be benefits 
and burdens (Cho, Arthurs, Townsend, Miller, & Barden, 2016; Graffin et al., 2012b; 
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Zavyalova et al., 2016a) at both the individual and organizational level. CEO’s 
compensation, for example, was found to be positively related to CEO celebrity, but this 
effect is contingent on positive organizational performance (Wade et al., 2006). When 
stakeholders’ higher expectations about organizational performance are disappointed, 
CEO celebrity has a negative impact on compensation (Wade et al., 2006), and celebrity 
CEOs are less likely to retain most of their compensation benefits (Graffin, Wade, Porac, 
& McNamee, 2008). CEO celebrity can foster value creation at the organizational level 
by fostering stakeholders’ expectations for higher quality and greater potential (Wade et 
al., 2006), ultimately increasing stakeholders’ willingness to participate in the 
organization (Rindova et al., 2006). Nevertheless, CEO celebrity may become 
detrimental to organizational performance by fostering hubris and overconfidence in the 
organization’s leader (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Sinha et al., 2012), eventually 
generating biases within the organization decision making process (Cho et al., 2016). The 
more often individuals are exposed to certain information, the more likely they are to 
adopt that information and believe it is accurate (Hawkins & Hoch, 1992; Hayward et al., 
2004). Consequently, the greater the celebrity of a CEO, the more likely he/she will be to 
adopt the notion that he/she is the cause of the organization’s success (Hayward et al., 
2004). The internalization of such attributions will, over time, generate strategic inertia as 
the CEO may become overly committed to the actions that have gained him/her celebrity 
(Hayward et al., 2004). Empirical evidence shows that CEO celebrity has only a short 
lived positive effect on organizational performance, and in the long-term it seems to 
negatively affect organizational returns (Wade et al., 2006). Organizations led by 
60 
 
celebrity CEOs tend to pay higher premiums for target firms (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997) when prior performance deviates from the industry average (Cho et al., 2016). 
Lastly, at the individual level, celebrity is mobile across firms (e.g. CEO succession). It 
follows that it cannot be considered as a stable strategic resource for the organization 
(Graffin et al., 2012b).  
Organizational Celebrity. Current theory on organizational celebrity suggests that 
it arises as the media attribute industry or societal level changes to distinctive 
organizations (Rindova et al., 2006). The emergence of organizational celebrity is 
attributed to media narratives like this extract from this Forbes article:  
“Uber is used to getting what it wants, wherever it wants. In 60 countries the ride-
hailing colossus has pursued an SUV-size take on Sun Tzu: Slip into a market by 
surprise, quickly suffocate any competitors and--if this infuriates entrenched taxi lobbies 
and government officials--never, ever back down. Uber has overcome violent taxi 
protests, and dozens of places that once dubbed it "illegal" now have laws codifying its 
business model--even the mayor of New York caved under an Uber-led outcry in July” 
(Huet & Chen, 2015).  
Organizational celebrity theory sustains that firms that undertake distinctive 
actions and display distinctive organizational identities are more likely to become the 
center of media attention, as journalists will use them as “vivid examples of important 
changes in industries and society in general” (Rindova et al., 2006: 52). By putting these 
organizations in the spotlight, the media try to emotionally engage their audiences 
through the creation of a dramatized reality (Rindova et al., 2006). Once again, the more 
that idiosyncratic information about the organization, its culture, identity, and activities 
are available to the media to build such dramatized realities, the more likely is 
organizational celebrity to emerge (Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016a). 
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When looking at the consequences of organizational celebrity, researchers found 
that it affects organizational processes and outcomes. First, organizational celebrity has 
been shown to have both a sense-making and self-enhancement effect on organizational 
members (Kjærgaard et al., 2011). Over time, it can hinder identity work within an 
organization, as the positive media attention received by the organization is too appealing 
for its members to be disregarded. Even when it is in contrast with their direct experience 
within the organization (Kjærgaard et al., 2011), the information publicized by the media 
about the organization can provide building blocks in the members’ self-concepts and 
identification processes (Dutton et al., 1994). At the organizational level, celebrity 
organizations are more likely to announce positive earnings surprises, to receive greater 
market rewards when announcing positive earnings surprises, and to receive smaller 
market penalties when announcing negative earnings surprises (Pfarrer et al., 2010).  
To summarize, empirical evidences suggest that at the individual level, CEO 
celebrity is mobile across organizations and in the long term may be detrimental for 
organizational performance. On the other hand, organizational celebrity seems to have 
positive effects on organizational outcomes. Given these differences, understanding how 
CEO and organizational celebrity emerge is of primary importance. As discussed above, 
theory on celebrity claims that it emerges at both the individual and the organizational 
level as CEOs and organizations undertake distinctive actions that set them apart from 
their competitors. Such distinctive actions attract attention and make those organizations 
and their leaders newsworthy. Yet, these well-established theoretical claims may 
necessitate further empirical investigation, as most of the empirical research on the topic 
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has focused on the consequences of celebrity (see Figure 2.12). By providing evidence of 
the important effects of celebrity at both the individual and organizational level, this body 
of literature not only contributes to strategic management and organizational theory, but 
also legitimizes the need for further empirical research to investigate how these social 
approval assets can be achieved. 
Competitive Actions 
Individuals are more likely to direct attention towards categories or stimuli that 
are accessible and salient (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Accessibility refers to the fact that 
recently and frequently activated ideas or topics come to mind more easily than ideas or 
topics that have not been activated (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 60). Research shows that 
accessibility affects individual’s encoding processes, as individual’s attention is primed 
for categories and concepts that fit what they have thought about recently or frequently 
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 60). Accessibility is the cognitive mechanism behind priming – 
i.e. the effect of prior knowledge on the interpretation of new stimuli (Fiske & Taylor, 
2013: 60). Priming research shows that stimuli are assimilated to accessible categories. 
Once stimuli are attributed to certain categories over time, these repeated judgements can 
become automatic (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), and individuals may not be aware of how 
specific frames repeatedly surface in their interpretations of other social actors’ 
behaviors. Given that automatic activation can influence cognitive interpretations and 




2 Tables and Figures are reported in Appendix 2 at the end of Chapter 2 
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behaviors (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), and frequently occurring stimuli are more likely to 
dominate perception, be recalled and acted upon (Pollock et al., 2008), how do 
organizations and CEOs become more or less accessible to the media? 
Research shows that an organization’s competitive actions can function as signals 
that shape a firm’s reputation among its constituents (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & 
Derfus, 2006; Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007). In a study on reputation accumulation 
of new entrants, Rindova and colleagues (Rindova et al., 2007) find that the company that 
undertook more actions during the observation period, had the highest level of media 
coverage (Rindova et al., 2007). By undertaking more competitive actions, organizations 
are more likely to attract media attention, since more information will be potentially 
available to the media (Basdeo et al., 2006). However, to attract positive media coverage, 
the competitive actions undertaken by an organization need to have a positive 
connotation. Negatively valued competitive actions, indeed, may be more likely to attract 
negative media coverage, fostering the development of infamy (Zavyalova et al., 2016a) 
Indeed, to generate celebrity, competitive actions need to have a certain degree of 
legitimacy in the eye of the beholder, to be received and interpreted positively.  
I suggest that the more positively charged competitive actions are undertaken by 
the organization (Basdeo et al., 2006; Rindova et al., 2007), the more likely are both 
organizational and CEO celebrity to emerge. Indeed, the accessibility attained through 
positive competitive actions will likely affect the media decision to cover certain events 
and organizations, but not the level of frame adopted in the story. Stated formally: 
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Hypothesis 1a: The greater the ratio of positively valued competitive actions 
undertaken by an organization, the greater the likelihood of organizational celebrity to 
emerge.  
Hypothesis 1b: The greater the ratio of positively valued competitive actions 
undertaken by an organization, the greater the likelihood of CEO celebrity to emerge. 
Salience refers to the extent to which a specific stimulus stands out compared to 
others in the immediate or larger environment (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 52); therefore, 
salience is a property of a stimulus in its context, rather than an absolute characteristic of 
the stimulus itself (Fiske & Taylor, 2013: 52). Multiple causes of social salience have 
been identified in the literature. Within social contexts, individuals tend to pay attention 
to “expectancy-inconsistent information” (Fiske & Taylor, 2013:53). Social actors, like 
the media, develop beliefs on the type of actions to be expected in a specific context 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Rindova et al., 2006). When these expectations are disregarded, 
attention increases. Consequently, when the actions taken are unusual for a) the subject 
(e.g. behaving out-of-character) and/or b) the subject’s social category (e.g. behaving out-
of-role) they are more salient and, therefore, more likely to attract attention (Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013). Overall, therefore, actions are perceived as distinctive when they diverge 
from the kind of actions that are expected to occur in a given context.  
Current theory on celebrity suggests that these kinds of actions are more likely to 
attract media attention (Hayward et al., 2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Actions that deviate 
from the contextual norms are more likely to attract media attention because they 
represent obtrusive events that deviate from expectations (Deephouse, 1999; Pollock, 
65 
 
Rindova, & Maggitti, 2008; Rindova et al., 2006). Distinctive actions are more salient 
and, therefore, more likely to be noticed and become the focus of attention (Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013).  
Salient external stimuli are more likely to activate encoding processes, and to be 
transformed into internal representations; consequently, stories about change are deemed 
more newsworthy than stories about the status quo (Rindova et al., 2006). Therefore, 
distinctive actions that are positively evaluated are likely to contribute to the development 
of celebrity (Hayward et al., 2004; Heckert & Heckert, 2002; Rindova et al., 2006). Also, 
action distinctiveness is likely to strengthen the relationship between the positive 
competitive actions and both organizational and CEO celebrity. Indeed, the accessibility 
attained through positive competitive actions, and the saliency attained through the high 
distinctiveness of those competitive action will likely affect the media decision to cover 
certain events and organizations, but not the level of frame adopted in the stories. 
Consequently, I expect that the greater the action distinctiveness, the greater the 
likelihood that the ratio of positively valued competitive actions will foster the 
development of organizational and CEO celebrity. Stated formally:  
Hypothesis 2a: Action distinctiveness strengthens the positive relationship 
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions undertaken by an organization 
and the likelihood of organizational celebrity to emerge.  
Hypothesis 2a: Action distinctiveness strengthens the positive relationship between the 
ratio of positively valued competitive actions undertaken by an organization and the 




Wire agencies and corporate communication materials represent very important 
sources of information used by journalists to develop news content (Blyskal & Blyskal, 
1985; Rindova et al., 2006). Public relations activities tend to have a strong influence on 
the media agenda (Cameron et al., 1997; Kiousis et al., 2006; Lee & Solomon, 1990). 
Using a diverse set of communication tools, public relations professionals provide 
information subsidies to journalists to affect the content of media coverage (Kiousis et 
al., 2006). On average, journalists estimate that 44% of news media content in the United 
States is affected by public relations practitioners (Sallot & Johnson, 2006). Such 
information subsidies are important to journalists as they decrease the time necessary to 
develop a news story and minimize the associated costs (Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001). 
Specifically, press releases have been found to have a particularly important role in the 
process of agenda-building (Kiousis et al., 2006; Tedesco, 2001). In the business context, 
Pollock and colleagues found in a study on IPOs a correlation of .42 between the volume 
of press releases and the volume of media coverage (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). 
Investigating corporate takeovers, Ohl and colleagues found that organizational press 
releases influence the frequency of coverage as well as the interpretations adopted by 
journalists in their coverage of these events (Ohl et al., 1995). It follows that 
organizational press releases not only influence the likelihood of certain organizational 
events to be reported, but also how they are framed in the media agenda.  
Firms tend to rely on carefully planned communications, given the importance of 
organizational communication materials in the construction of the media agenda, as they 
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try to manage the impressions of stakeholders and to project desired images to their 
audiences (Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto, 2005; Rindova et al., 2006). By framing 
(Entman, 1993) the communications to the media, an organization makes judgments in 
deciding what to say about a certain event, and such decisions influence the way the 
event is understood by the audience (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). As social actors, 
organizations have self-presentation goals and attempt to “enhance their respectability 
and impressiveness in the eyes of constituents” (Highhouse et al., 2009: 1481). The 
information communicated by organizations through public relations experts represents 
an output of such self-presentation goals. Public relations professionals act as “frame 
strategists” (Hallahan, 1999: 224) that, providing idiosyncratic information about the 
CEO persona, organizational actions, and organizational culture, can exert their agency in 
the development of media narratives about organizational life. 
For the purposes of this essay, special attention is given to the effect of causal 
attributions within organizational communication materials on the development of 
journalists’ causal attributions. I suggest that, given the great influence of organizational 
communication material on the development of media reporting, the attributional frames 
reported in such materials will moderate the relationship between competitive actions and 
the emergence of celebrity. This is due to multiple reasons. First, the presence of specific 
levels of attributional frames within organizational communication materials will foster 
the accessibility and salience of those frames in the mind of the journalists. Events are 
more likely attributed to salient causes (Kelley & Michela, 1980) and the attention paid to 
specific attributional frames in the organizational communication materials will foster the 
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prominence of those frames, increasing recall and crystallizing media interpretations 
(Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Furthermore, given the constraints of the journalistic profession 
(Hayward et al., 2004; Tuchman, 1978), reporters are more likely to reinforce familiar 
explanations by gathering few additional sources of supporting evidence, rather than 
actively seeking disconfirming ones (Hayward et al., 2004). To the extent, that a specific 
attributional frame is made available to the media through organizational communication 
materials, it will become more familiar, consequently increasing the likelihood of its 
adoption.  
To summarize, due to the large use of organizational communication materials in 
media reporting about organizational life, increased accessibility and salience, and the 
constraints of the journalistic profession, I expect that the presence of individual (or 
organizational) frames within organizational communication materials to the media 
affects the relationship between distinctive and positively valued competitive actions and 
the emergence of celebrity. I suggest that the more the distinctive and positively valued 
competitive actions are coupled with organizational-framed communication materials, the 
more likely is organizational celebrity to emerge. The availability of organizational 
frames will minimize the need to resort to entirely new attributions, considerably 
decreasing the time needed to develop a news story. On the other hand, the more the 
distinctive and positively valued competitive actions coupled with CEO-framed 
communication materials, the more likely is CEO celebrity to emerge. In these situations, 
an individual attributional frame is made more accessible and salient in the mind of the 
journalists as they build their narratives. Stated formally: 
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Hypothesis 3a: Organizational-focused communication materials strengthen the 
likelihood that distinctive and positively valued competitive action will foster the 
emergence of organizational celebrity.  
Hypothesis 3b: CEO-focused communication materials strengthen the likelihood 
that distinctive and positively valued competitive action will foster the emergence of CEO 
celebrity.  
CEO Tenure 
Temporal information about a cause and its effect is often used to develop causal 
attributions (Kelley, 1973). Psychology research suggests that causality cannot be 
observed directly, and although certain events seem to solicit immediate causal 
attributions, individuals still have to resort to interpretative processes to assess causality, 
as nothing in the event itself can assure causal relations (Buehner, 2005). Individuals tend 
to apply multiple principles to infer causality from the temporal correlation between 
cause and effect (Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989). Specifically, attribution theory 
suggests that temporal contiguity is an important criterion in the formation of causal 
attributions. Essentially, this concept refers to the idea that to form a causal attribution, 
the effect and its cause should occur in temporal proximity (Kelley & Michela, 1980). 
Moreover, ambiguities about cause and effects are addressed through the rule of temporal 
precedence that assumes a cause should precede its effect (Kelley & Michela, 1980 
1294). 
In the context of this essay, the timing of the observed event is an important factor 
in the development of journalists’ attributions, with specific respect to the CEO’s tenure 
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within the organization. Research in the upper echelon tradition (Hambrick, 2011; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984) has found that organizations tend to become reflections of 
their top management, and that CEOs characteristics such as personality and functional 
background can predict organizational strategic actions (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 
2006). Given the central role played by CEOs in organizational life, CEOs’ successions 
tend to be considered newsworthy events and are often covered by the media. Also, when 
selecting a new CEO, boards of directors attempt to identify someone with competences 
and experiences in line with the specific conditions of the organization (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Henderson et al., 2006). Typically, CEOs take office with a certain 
degree of awareness about the mandate they were hired to fulfill (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). Such awareness is also likely shared 
with shareholders and other external stakeholders such as analysts and business media. I 
expect that CEO’s tenure at the time of the event will affect the causal attributions 
developed by the media. Lastly, attribution theory claims that to the extent that a given 
outcome occurs in the presence of a particular social actor, and not in the presence of 
other social actors, casual attribution is more likely to occur (Kelley, 1973).  
Overall, I suggest that when distinctive competitive actions occur closely 
(temporal contiguity) after (temporal precedence) the appointment of a new CEO, 
journalists are led to more strongly attribute those events to the new individual rather than 
to the organization, since the event is not aligned with the organization’s behavioral 
history, or industry norms (Hayward et al., 2004; Kelley, 1973), and it happens in closer 
proximity to the CEO’s appointment. Consequently, I expect that when an organization 
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undertakes more positively valued competitive actions that are also highly distinctive, 
and this happens early in the tenure of the CEO, the media will be more likely to adopt 
individual level attributions, consequently fostering the likelihood of CEO celebrity to 
emerge. Stated formally: 
Hypothesis 4: Shorter CEO tenure strengthens the likelihood that distinctive and 
positively valued competitive actions will foster the emergence of CEO celebrity.  
CEO Founder Role 
Framing occurs at multiple levels: in the culture, in the mind of elites and 
professional communicators, in the texts of communication, and in the minds of the 
audience (Entman et al., 2009). Therefore, framing should be interpreted as a diachronic 
process where in their choice of frames, journalists are bounded by the cultural stock of 
schemas commonly found in a society which record the traces of past framing (Entman et 
al., 2009). Not all frames are equally potent. Certain frames have a natural advantage 
because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes. In general, 
resonance increases the appeal of a frame as it makes a frame appear natural and familiar. 
Overall, resonance not only facilitates the effect of the frame on the final audiences but 
also the likelihood that a frame will be adopted by journalists, given that journalists and 
audiences are in the same culture (Gamson & Modigliani, 1994).  
Entrepreneurship is a popular frame in modern society (Shane, 2008). A Google 
search for the word “entrepreneur” returns 227 million results. Also, the Google Ngram 
Viewer (i.e. an online search engine that plots frequencies of search string using a yearly 
count found in the Google’s text corpora of printed material between 1500 and 2008) 
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shows that the words “entrepreneur”, “entrepreneurs” and “entrepreneurship” have 
become more and more common over time. Entrepreneurs are often regarded as modern 
heroes, and viewed as larger-than-life individuals (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005). “The 
notion of a risk taker who bucks the odds to build a business empire captures the 
twentieth century imagination in much the same way that great explorers of earlier years 
invigorated their countryman” (Rubenson & Gupta, 1992:53). This myth about 
entrepreneurship appeals to media audiences as it portrays heroic stories of individuals 
that, overcoming great challenges, become successful (Shane, 2008). Such 
entrepreneurship myths saturate all types of media (Shane, 2008), providing a 
romanticized view of entrepreneurship (Shane, 2008; Wood & Holcomb, 2011).  
As entrepreneurial myths are widely available in the broader culture of western 
societies (Shane, 2008), when the CEO is the founder of the organization, he is more 
likely to become the face of the organization, thus fostering the development of 
leadership-based dramatic narratives. I theorize that the underlying ideology of 
entrepreneurial agency (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005) permeating modern culture makes 
CEOs attributions more likely to emerge in media narratives about organizations led by a 
founder. Therefore, I expect that when an organization undertakes positively valued 
competitive actions that are highly distinctive, and this happens under the leadership of a 
founder CEO, the media will more likely to adopt individual level attributions and, 
consequently, foster CEO celebrity.  
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Hypothesis 5: When the CEO is also the founder the likelihood that distinctive 
and positively valued competitive action will foster the emergence of CEO celebrity is 
stronger. 
The conceptual models are reported in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3.  
Method 
Sample 
The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 244 companies over 16 years 
(between 2000 and 2015), for a total of 3,245 observations. Over 50% of the sample was 
observed for all the time periods, and over 75% of the sample is observed for 10 time 
periods or more. Companies that were not observed for all the time periods were founded 
after the first time period (year=2000) and, therefore, appear in the panel at later times. 
The companies in the sample were selected in 2016 from the Fortune 500 and the 
Unicorn lists, between 2001 and 2015. The Fortune 500 list includes U.S. based 
companies ranked by total revenues. The Unicorn list includes privately-held 
organizations with market valuations over $1 billion, ranked by valuation, and is based 
on a combination of data from PitchBook, CB Insights, news reports and Fortune’s own 
investigation. The combination of these lists allows both established and entrepreneurial 
companies in the sample.  
Certain industries may attract higher levels of media attention. Organizations 
operating in those industries are, therefore, more likely to attract media attention, as a 
function of the industry they operate in. Nevertheless, organizations operating in less 
newsworthy industries may still achieve celebrity as a function of their distinctive 
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behaviors. By selecting organizations in industries that experience different levels of 
overall media attention, it is possible to unpack differences on how celebrity emerges 
within environments that are more or less conducive to its development. The Factiva 
database was used to selected different industries based on their overall media visibility 
in 2013. Industries with high, medium and low media coverage were identified and 
selected, and the final sample, therefore, consisted of an industry-stratified sample based 
on industry visibility. The sample composition is reported in Table 2.1. 
Dependent Variables 
Organizational Celebrity. Organizational celebrity was measured as the volume 
and tenor of media coverage an organization received (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Media 
volume was operationalized as the total number of articles published about an 
organization each year in Forbes and Bloomberg BusinessWeek, as the type of articles 
published in these magazines are likely to have the depth and breadth needed to develop 
the dramatized realities that foster the development of celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010). 
Both magazines are among the most read business magazines in the U.S. with a total 
circulation of 980,000 in 2016 for Bloomberg BusinessWeek3, and a readership of over 46 
million across multiple platforms for Forbes in spring 2015.4 The articles (a total of 
8,824) were obtained through a search by company name within the Factiva database. 
Following previous practice in measuring organizational celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010), 








firms in the top quartile of media visibility in a given year were coded as 1 for media 
volume (0 otherwise).  
Each article was then content analyzed to assess the tenor of media coverage, by 
identifying the degree of positive and negative affective language present in each article 
(Pfarrer et al., 2010). The Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) dictionary of more 
than 900 affective words (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) was used to content 
analyze the articles. Following established procedure in the study of celebrity, I created a 
ratio of each article’s positive affective content to its total affective content (Pfarrer et al., 
2010; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). An article was coded as positive if its 
total affective language was at least 60 percent positive, and negative if its total affective 
content was at least 60 percent negative (Pfarrer et al., 2010). The overall affective 
resonance of media coverage was measured as the difference between the number of 
positive and the number of negative articles published about a company in a given year 
(Zavyalova et al., 2012).5 Firms in the top quartile of tenor of coverage, in a given year, 
were coded as 1 (0 otherwise). Firms that were in the top quartile for both visibility and 
tenor, in a given year, were coded as celebrity (1, 0 otherwise) (Pfarrer et al., 2010).  
CEO Celebrity. Following the same methodology used for the operationalization 
of organizational celebrity, CEO celebrity was measured as the volume and tenor of 
media coverage about the CEOs of the companies in the sample. The articles were 




5 The analyses were also conducted using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Pfarrer et al. 2010). 
The results remained essentially unchanged.  
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obtained through a search by CEO name within the Factiva database, for a total of 1,539 
articles. Following an equivalent approach to the measure of organizational celebrity, 
companies with a CEO in the top quartile of media visibility, in a given year, were coded 
as 1 for media volume (0 otherwise). Once again, each article was content analyzed using 
the LIWC dictionary for affective words and coded as positive, negative or neutral 
according to its affective content (Pfarrer et al., 2010). The overall affective resonance of 
media coverage was measured as the difference between the number of positive and the 
number of negative articles published about a CEO in a given year (Zavyalova et al., 
2012).6 Firms in the top quartile of tenor of the CEO coverage, in a given year, were 
coded as 1 (0 otherwise). Firms that were in the top quartile for both CEO visibility and 
tenor, in a given year, were coded as having CEO celebrity (1, 0 otherwise). 
As articles about organizations are likely to mention the CEO and vice versa, each 
article was assigned to organizational or CEO celebrity based on the total number of 
times each of these social actors was mentioned in the text. Specifically, an article was 
assigned to the organization when the total number of mentions of the organization 
divided by the total number of mentions of the organization and the CEO combined was 
equal to or above 70%. An article was assigned to the CEO when the total number of 




6 The analyses were also conducted using the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Pfarrer et al. 2010). 
The results remained substantially unchanged.  
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mentions of the organization divided by the total number of mentions of the organization 
and the CEO combined was equal to or below 70%.7  
Independent Variables 
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions. Following previous literature on 
competitive dynamics, competitive actions was defined as “externally directed, specific, 
and observable moves initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive position” (Connelly, 
Tihanyi, Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier, 2016: 8) The RavenPack News Analytics database 
was used to collect data about a company’s competitive actions. This database collects 
information on companies and other types of entities by monitoring the Dow Jones 
Financial Newswires, regional editions of the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s and 
MarketWatch, as well as over 19,000 online sources including business publishers, 
national and local news and blogs, and 22 newswire and press releases distribution 
networks including PRNewswire, Canadian News Wire, LSE Regulatory News Service 
and others (RavenPack, 2015). Using a computerized approach to text analysis, 
RavenPack allows the collection of reliable data on competitive actions, by identifying all 
the entities mentioned in a story, categorizing the event reported in a story, and coding 
the role played by each entity in a story (Connelly et al., 2016). For the purpose of this 
essay, and following previous literature on competitive dynamics, I focused on eight 




7 The cut-off point was chosen after considering the frequency distribution of CEO and organizational 
mentions in the corpora of articles. The analyses were conducted at different percent levels (80-20 percent, 
90-10 percent). The results remained substantially unchanged. 
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types of competitive actions (Connelly et al., 2016; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 
2008; Ferrier, 2001). Specifically, I collected information on actions relating to: new 
product, capacity, pricing, marketing, acquisitions, strategic alliances, market expansion, 
and legal matters. Table 2.2 reports headlines examples for each action category, as well 
as the RavenPack classification. Overall, I identified 28,598 unique competitive actions 
for the companies in the sample, during the time covered by the panel. This corresponds 
to an average of 8.81 actions per company per year, which is in line with prior research 
on competitive dynamics (Connelly et al., 2016).  
The RavenPack’s Event Sentiment Score (ESS) – a sentiment analysis that 
quantifies positive and negative perceptions of the events reported in the stories – was 
then used to identify positive competitive actions that may lead to the positive media 
coverage needed to attain organizational and CEO celebrity. RavenPack ESS is a score 
between 0 and 100 that measure the news sentiment for a given organization by 
combining different proxies. Values of 50 indicate neutral sentiment, values above 50 
indicate positive sentiment and values below 50 indicate negative sentiment (RavenPack, 
2015). The score is obtained by combining the RavenPack Experts Consensus 
Methodology with analyses and computations of quantitative and qualitative information, 
when provided in the news about the event (RavenPack, 2015). Specifically, the Expert 
Consensus Methodology entails an automated computer classification algorithm, based 
on the results of financial experts’ classification of specific events. In details, financial 
experts’ opinions about the likelihood of an event to have positive or negative 
consequences on the stock price of a given company are used to develop a training 
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classification algorithm (RavenPack, 2015). Furthermore, the ESS sentiment score has a 
strength component that is influenced by a variety of quantitative and qualitative 
information – e.g.: magnitude of the event, analyst ratings, comparison of actual versus 
estimated values – when available in the news (RavenPack, 2015). The ratio of positive 
competitive actions was obtained by dividing the number of competitive actions with an 
ESS above 50 over the total number of actions undertaken by a company in a given year8.  
Actions Distinctiveness. Action distinctiveness was operationalized in terms of 
distinctiveness toward an organization’s strategic history – i.e. the degree to which a 
given set of strategic actions undertaken by an organization differs from the actions 
undertaken by the same organization in a previous time period – and toward industry 
norms – i.e. degree to which a given set of strategic actions undertaken by an 
organization differs from the actions undertaken by other organizations in the same 
industry.  
First, following the procedure by Ferrier and colleagues (Ferrier, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1999), strategic distinctiveness was measured as an Euclidean distance measure 
across actions types (Ferrier et al., 1999). The sum of the squared differences in the 
proportions of competitive actions carried out across all action categories was calculated 
following the formula: 




8 Higher cut-off points were also considered (e.g. ESS = 60 and ESS=70). However, the ESS seem to be a 
conservative measure of positivity of competitive actions. Higher cut-off points would consider new 
product releases, new market entry, joint ventures and partnerships as well as construction of new or 
upgrades of facilities as non-positive events. To this extent, the ESS > 50 cut-off point was chosen.  
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Σa (Ia,t/It – Ia,t-1/It-1)
2, 
where Ia,t is the frequency of the firm’s actions in the ath action category of company I in 
a given year, It is the total count of firm’s actions in the same time period for company I, 
Ia,t-1 is the frequency of actions in the ath action category for the same organization in the 
previous year, and It-1 is the total count of actions for the same organization in the 
previous year.  A low score indicates that the entire set of actions changes only little 
across time periods. A high score signifies that the entire set of actions changes greatly 
across time periods. 
Second, industry distinctiveness was measured as an Euclidean distance measure 
across action types (Ferrier et al., 1999). The sum of the squared differences in the 
proportions of competitive actions carried out across all action categories was measured 
following the formula: 
Σa (Ia,t/It – Ca,t/Ct)
2, 
where Ia,t is the frequency of the firm’s actions in the ath action category of company I, It 
is the total count of firm’s actions in the same time period for company I, Ca,t is the 
frequency of actions in the ath action category for the other companies in the same 
industry, and Ct is the total count of actions for the other companies in the same industry 
in the same time period. A low score will indicate that the entire set of actions changes 
only little across companies. A high score will signify that the entire set of actions 
changes greatly when compared to industry norms. 
CEO Tenure. CEO tenure was measured as the years elapsed since the 
appointment of the CEO. Information about a CEO’s tenure was collected using the 
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ExecuComp Database, LinkedIn, Factiva database, and other online sources such as 
personal and company websites.  
CEO Founder Role. Founder role was operationalized as a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the CEO is also part of the founding team (0 otherwise). Information about a 
CEO’s founder role were collected using LinkedIn, Factiva, and other online sources 
such as personal and companies’ websites. 
Frames in Organizational Press Releases. To assess the types of frames used in 
the organizational communication materials I content analyzed organizational press 
releases (PR). A search for each company in the sample was conducted within the 
Business Wire and Factiva Press Releases Service sources, and returned a total of 
130,384 PR. Each PR was content analyzed to identify the predominance of an individual 
or organizational frame. Organizational prominence was measured as the number of 
organization mentions and divided by the total number of mentions of the organization 
and CEO combined. Specifically, a PR was assigned to the organization when the ratio 
was equal to or above 90%, and to the CEO when the ratio was equal or below 90%.9 




9 Organizations are often mentioned multiple times within a PR, and some of these mentions serve to 
provide contact and legal information. The cutoff point was chosen by looking at the distribution of the 
ratio here described, and keeping into account this overall prevalence of organizational mentions within 
organizational press releases. The analyses were conducted looking at different cutoff points and the results 




To account for other possible explanations several control variables were 
included. First, Year fixed effects were introduced to account for the influence of 
aggregate trends. Second, positive organizational performance may attract positive media 
coverage, therefore, I controlled for the Ratio of positive performance announcements. 
Performance announcements were chosen as a measure of performance as they were 
available for both Fortune 500 and Unicorns10 companies; moreover, performance 
announcement, being directly available to the media, are likely to generate media 
coverage and are, therefore, extremely relevant for the purpose of this essay. This 
information was obtained using the RavenPack database, and operationalized as the 
number of positive performance announcements over the total number of performance 
announcements by a company in a given year (see Table 2.3). Also, I controlled for the 
number of Awards received by a company in a given year, as such events often generate 
positive media coverage. Once again, information about these events was collected 
through the RavenPack database (see Table 2.3).11 Lastly, I controlled for the previous 
year level of organizational celebrity and CEO celebrity. 




10 As privately held corporations, financial information for companies in the Unicorns list was not readily 
available. 
11 For the analyses that did not used fixed effect estimations, industry and company type (Fortune 500 vs. 
Unicorns) were also used as control variables.  
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Data Description and Analysis 
Table 2.4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables in 
this essay. Comparing within and between variation, some of the variables of theoretical 
interest have greater between than within variation (see Table 2.4), so within estimation 
may lead to considerable efficiency loss (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
Organizational Celebrity. Overall, 84.35% of the company-year observations did 
not have organizational celebrity, and 15.65% did. The between summary indicates that 
of the 244 companies in the sample, 239 (97.95%) did not have celebrity at least onetime 
during the time considered by the panel, and 117 (47.95%) had celebrity at least once. 
Therefore, of the companies in the sample, 45.90% changed at least once from celebrity 
to non-celebrity organization, or vice versa (see Table 2.5). The within summary 
indicates that 87.44% of the companies that did not have celebrity in at least one time 
period, never achieved it during the time covered by the panel, and 29.92% of the 
companies that had celebrity maintained it for all the time periods covered by the panel. 
The data also show persistence in organizational celebrity over time. Looking at the 
transition probabilities (see Table 2.6) from one period to the next, 59.62% of the 
observations with celebrity for one year maintained it during the following year of 
observation. On the other hand, 91.87% of observations with no celebrity for one year 
maintained the no-celebrity during the following year. The first order autocorrelation of 
organizational celebrity is .507; when considering all lags, autocorrelation varies little 
with lag length, and no discernible patterns can be identified. 
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CEO Celebrity. Overall, 87.06% of the company-year observations did not 
achieve CEO celebrity over the time periods considered in the panel, and 12.94% did. 
The between summary indicates that of the 244 companies in the sample, 243 (99.59%) 
did not had CEO celebrity at least one time over the time periods covered by the panel, 
and 119 (48.77%) had CEO celebrity at least once (see Table 2.5). This means that, of the 
sampled companies, 48.36% changed at least once from CEO celebrity to non-CEO-
celebrity, or vice versa. The within summary indicates that 26.33% of companies that 
ever had CEO celebrity, always had it over the time period consider in the panel, and 
87.52% that did not have CEO celebrity never achieved it. Of the company-year 
observations that ever had CEO celebrity in one period, 51.68% maintained it for the 
following year. And for those who did not have CEO celebrity in one period, 92.12% 
remained without CEO celebrity for the following year (see Table 2.6). The first order 
autocorrelation of organizational celebrity is .430; when considering all lags, 
autocorrelation seems to decrease with lag length.  
Overall, the data seem to suggest that organizational and CEO celebrity are 
equally difficult to achieve as about 92% of the observations without celebrity (at either 
level) do not achieve it the following year. On the other hand, CEO celebrity seem to be 
more volatile than organizational celebrity, as about 52% of the observations with CEO 
celebrity maintained it for the following year, while about 60% of the observations with 




Multiple estimation models are available for panel data. First, cross-sectional 
ordinary lease square (OLS) regression assumes that the vector of predictor variables (x) 
in the equation: 
yit = βxit + uit 
can change across i and t, and it assumes that xit and uit are not correlated. Such an 
assumption is potentially spurious with panel data with repeated measures over time. In 
these situations, pooled OLS can be used, as the Huber-White sandwich estimate (HWS) 
allows handling potential correlation between predictors and error term. Using the HWS 
estimate add an unobservable component (ci) to the error term to account for the 
possibility that a component of the error term is correlated with the predictors. Second, 
generalized least squares (GLM) estimators with random effects and OLS estimators with 
conditional fixed effects also can be used with panel data. These models help managing 
issues with potential unobserved heterogeneity between predictors and unobserved 
variables (Petersen, 1993), but in different ways. Similarly, to pooled OLS, random and 
fixed effects estimators include an omitted variable component (ci) in the regression 
equation: 
yit = βxit + ci + uit 
Random effect and fixed effects models both assume that the predictors are strictly 
exogenous from the error term (E[uit | xi, ci] = 0). However, random effects models make 
the extra assumption that the observed variables are not correlated with the unobserved 
ones (E[ci | xi] = 0). On the other hand, fixed effects models specifically allows for 
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E(ci|xi) to be a function of xi (Wooldridge, 2010). Fixed effects models can control for all 
unmeasured variables that are fixed over time, allowing consistent estimates 
(Wooldridge, 2010). However, fixed effects models, tend to use data less efficiently as 
they cannot estimate time-invariant variables, and tend to estimate poorly coefficients for 
predictors that vary only slightly over time (Wooldridge, 2010). To test the consistency 
of random effects estimator, I run the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), comparing the 
difference between the coefficients estimated with the fixed effect, against the 
coefficients estimated with the random effects. The results, for both organizational and 
CEO celebrity indicate that the random effect would not produce consistent estimates 
and, therefore, fixed effects estimation should be used.  
A fixed effect non-linear model assumes that ci (a company effect) is an 
unobserved random variable that may be correlated with the regressors xit. In short panels 
the joint estimation of the N incidental parameters ci and xi could lead to inconsistent 
estimation of all parameters as there are only Ti observations for each ci. For the logit 
model, however, it is possible to use the conditional maximum likelihood estimator to 
eliminate αi from the estimation equation. Base on a log density for the ith company that 
conditions on ΣTit=1 yit the total number of outcomes equal to 1 for a given company over 
time, the resulting model is a logit with the regressors xi2 -xi1. Given this specificity of the 
estimation model, time invariant coefficients cannot be estimated. Also, this leads to the 






Hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a test the probability that a company will have 
organizational celebrity contingent on the ratio of positively valued competitive actions it 
undertakes, the distinctiveness of those competitive actions, and the focus of its 
organizational communication materials. The results are reported in Table 2.7. As 
discussed earlier, about 87% of the companies that did not have celebrity in at least one 
time period never achieved it during the time periods covered by the panel, and about 
30% of the companies that had celebrity maintained it for all the time periods covered by 
the panel. Given the estimation model discussed above, those observations cannot be 
included in the analysis, leading to a significant loss of efficiency (N= 1,471; n=110).  
Model 1 in Table 2.7 reports the results when only control variables and year 
fixed effects are accounted for. The greater the ratio of positive performance 
announcements, the greater the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur (β=0.545, 
p=.001). This means that the odds ratio (OR) of achieving organizational celebrity 
increase to 1.725 following a 1 standard deviation increase in the ratio of positive 
performance announcements released by a company in a given year. CEO celebrity in the 
previous year has a positive but only marginally significant effect on the likelihood of 
achieving organizational celebrity the following year (β=0.438, p=0.059). The odds of 
achieving organizational celebrity increase to 1.550 if the company had CEO celebrity 
the previous year. The number of awards received by a company in a given year, the 
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CEO tenure or the CEO founder role, and previous level of organizational celebrity12 do 
not significantly affect the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur.  
In hypothesis 1a, I suggest the greater is the ratio of positively valued competitive 
actions the greater will be the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur. To test this 
hypothesis, in Model 2 the ratio of positively valued competitive actions is added to the 
equation. The results show that the greater the ratio of positively valued competitive 
actions undertaken by a company, the greater the likelihood of organizational celebrity to 
occur (β=0.247, p=0.048). Following a 1 standard deviation increase in the ratio of 
positive competitive actions undertaken by a company in a given year, the odds of 
achieving organizational celebrity increase to 1.281. Also, the effect remains significant 
even after accounting for strategic and industry distinctiveness (see Model 3 and 4 in 
Table 2.7), showing strong support for hypothesis 1a. Nevertheless, the AIC fit statistic 
shows that Model 2 fits the data only slightly better, when compared to the model with 
only control variables, and the pseudo-R2 only increases of .020.  
In hypothesis 2a, I suggest that the relationship between positively valued 
competitive actions and organizational celebrity is stronger for high levels of action 
distinctiveness. Model 6 in Table 2.7 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction 
term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions and strategic 




12 It is important to note once again that, given the estimation model, the sample could not include the 
observations that either never achieved or always maintained organizational celebrity during the time 
periods covered by the panel. This may explain why previous organizational celebrity does not significantly 
affect the likelihood of achieving celebrity the following year.  
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distinctiveness, while model 7 considers an interaction effect with industry 
distinctiveness. In both cases, the interaction term is not significant, suggesting no 
support for hypothesis 2a.  
In hypothesis 3b, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued 
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger when a company focuses its 
communication materials at the organizational level. Model 8 in Table 2.7 tests this 
hypothesis by including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued 
competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and organizational-focused PR. The 3-way 
interaction term is significant, suggesting preliminary support for hypothesis 3a. 
Moreover, the AIC fit statistic and the Pseudo-R2 show that the model fits the data better 
when compared to the model with only control variables. Therefore, further steps were 
taken to probe the nature of the interaction. First, I plotted the interaction to identify 
whether the slopes follow the hypothesized pattern (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Jaccard 
& Turrisi, 2003). The 2-way interaction between strategic distinctiveness and the ratio of 
positive competitive actions13 is plotted in Figure 2.4 to provide a baseline. From the 
graph, strategic distinctiveness seems to have a negative effect on the relationship 
between the ratio of positive competitive actions and the likelihood of organizational 
celebrity. Low strategic distinctiveness seems to be preferred to achieve celebrity (see 
Figure 2.4). Things change, however, when high strategic distinctiveness is combined 
with organizational-focused communication materials. Under the combined effect of 




13 Data from Model 8 in Table 2.7. 
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these moderators the slope seems to become positive, while it stays mostly unchanged for 
low organizational-focused communication (see Figure 2.4), providing preliminary 
support for H3b. 
Interaction plots are useful to illustrate the nature of the relationship and to 
provide a visual representation of the slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006). However, these 
plots do not allow inferences about the significance of each slope, or the existence of a 
significant difference among any pair of slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006). Given these 
limitations, I took further steps to statistically probe the nature of this relationship. 
Specifically, I conducted subgroup analyses (Aiken et al., 1991; Peters, O'Connor, & 
Wise, 1984), dividing the sample with a median14 split for the variable organizational-
focused PR. The effects of the ratio of positive competitive actions and its interaction 
with strategic distinctiveness were tested at high and low levels of organizational-focused 
PR separately. The results are reported in Table 2.8 and, in line with the interaction plot, 
show that the interaction term between the ratio of positive competitive actions and 
strategic distinctiveness is significant only for high levels of organizational-focused PR, 
suggesting further support for hypothesis 3a. To provide a visual representation of the 
nature of this effect, I plotted these interactions (see Figure 2.5). The slopes show that for 
the high organizational-focused PR sub-group, the relationship between ratio of 
positively valued competitive actions and the likelihood of organizational celebrity is 




14 The analyses were conducted with both a median and a mean split, producing consistent results. The 




stronger when combined with high level of strategic distinctiveness, again providing 
further support for hypothesis 3a. 
Lastly, to test the significance of each individual slope, I further split the sample 
on high and low levels of strategic distinctiveness and tested the direct effects of the ratio 
of positive competitive action on the likelihood of achieving organizational celebrity. The 
OR resulting from this analysis are reported in Table 2.915. Not surprisingly, and similar 
to the results of the previous subgroup analysis, the slopes are not significant in the 2 
subgroups of low organizational-focused PR. However, from this analysis, the slope high 
organizational-focused PR and low strategic distinctiveness is not significant. Although 
these post hoc tests do not allow inference as to whether there is a significant difference 
among any combination of the four slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006), the fact that only 
the high-high slope is significant provides further support for hypothesis 3a. When 
looking at the practical relevance of these results, the odds of achieving organizational 
celebrity due to an increase in 1 standard deviation in the ratio of positively valued 
competitive actions goes from 1.99 in the high strategic distinctiveness sub-group, to 3.38 
in the high strategic distinctiveness and high organizational-focused PR sub-group. 
Model 9 in Table 2.7 tests hypothesis 3a by including an interaction term between 
the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and 




15 Given the loss of efficiency following the use of the conditional maximum likelihood estimator with 
fixed effects (necessary to consistently estimate fixed effects non-linear models) previously discussed, this 
further analysis was conducted with pooled-OLS estimation, adding year, industry, and company type fixed 
effects and using cluster-robust standard errors. 
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organizational-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that 
there is not a 3-way interaction effect. Overall, therefore, partial support was found for 
hypothesis 3a as organizational-focused PR interact with the ratio of positively values 
competitive actions and with strategic distinctiveness in determining organizational 
celebrity, but not with industry distinctiveness.  
Robustness Analyses 
To investigate the presence of influential observations that may be driving the 
results, I obtained a plot of leverage points (Pregibon, 1981). From the scatterplot, two 
observations seem to have the potential of affecting the results. I run the model again 
without these observations and the results remained substantially unchanged.16 To correct 
for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors where computed using the vce (Jackknife) 
option. The lag-1 stationary autocorrelation of the residuals for company-year pairs range 
from .113 to -.053, with an average of -0.042. This provides a rough estimate of the 
interclass stationary correlation coefficient of the residuals. To test for multicollinearity, 
the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) were investigated. For model 5 (only direct effects), 
the VIFs were below 2.11 with an average of 1.62. For model 8 (3-way interaction with 
strategic distinctiveness) the VIFs were below 3.44, with an average of 1.91. These 
values are well below the 10 threshold (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004), 
suggesting multicollinearity is not a concern. To investigate the potential for a 




16 Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in 
Table 2.7, Table 2.8, and Table 2.9 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers 
are available upon request.  
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misspecification in the model, the linktest STATA command was used. The results 
indicate that the model is properly specified.  
Considering the significant efficiency loss caused by the conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation with fixed effects, a further analysis was conducted using the 
continuous data for organizational celebrity. Table 2.10 reports the results of the analysis 
conducted with fixed effects estimation – following the results of the Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978) – and robust standard errors.  
In model 1 only the control variables were entered. The results show that the ratio 
of positive performance announcements has a positive effect on organizational celebrity 
(β= 0.093, p=0.048), while the number of awards received seems to have a negative 
effect (β= -0.258, p=0.031). Also, previous level of organizational celebrity positively 
affects organizational celebrity the following year (β=0.686, p=0.000). CEO tenure, CEO 
founder role and previous level of CEO celebrity, instead, do not affect organizational 
celebrity when measured continuously.  
In Model 2, the ratio of positively valued competitive actions was added to the 
equation. The results show support for hypothesis 1a as the effect is positive and 
significant (β=.033, p=.027), however, the AIC statistic and R2 show that the overall 
model does not fit the data better than model 1, still the effect remains significant even 
when strategic and industry distinctiveness are included (see model 3 and 4 in Table 
2.10), providing further support for hypothesis 1a.  
To test for hypothesis 2a, model 6 considers the interaction between the ratio of 
positive competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness, and model 7 considers the 
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interaction with industry distinctiveness. The results show no significant effect in both 
cases, providing no support for hypothesis 2a. 
To test for hypothesis 3a, model 8 considers the 3-way interaction between the 
ratio of positive competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and organizational-focused 
PR. The interaction term is significant (β= - 0.280, p=.013), and the model fits the data 
better when compared to the model with only controls (AIC=6811.948; R2=0.796), 
providing preliminary support for hypothesis 3a. To further probe the nature of this 
relationship and provide a visual representation, I plotted the different slopes (Aiken et 
al., 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). In Figure 2.6 the 2-way interaction between the ratio 
of positive competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness is plotted to provide a visual 
base-line. As to show that, contrary to expectations, but in line with the results from the 
logistic models, there is not statistically significant or practically relevant interaction 
between the ratio of positively competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness. 
However, when plotting the 3-way interaction, the slopes suggest a positive relationship 
between the ratio of positive competitive actions and organizational celebrity for high 
organizational-focused PR under conditions of both high and low strategic 
distinctiveness, and a negative relationship for low organizational-focused PR under 
conditions of both high and low strategic distinctiveness. Given the limitations of the 
plotting technique for probing interaction effects, I also conducted a significance test for 
slope differences (Dawson & Richter, 2006). Such a test allows to assess whether the 
slopes are statically different across different levels of the moderating variables. The 
results indicate that all the slopes are statistically different from each other. 
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Lastly, model 9 considers the 3-way interaction with industry distinctiveness. The 
results show that the interaction term is significant (β= -0.575, p=0.010), and the model 
fits the data better than the model with only controls (AIC=6748.567; R2=.798), 
providing additional support for hypothesis 3a. Once again, to further investigate the 
nature of this relationship I plotted the interaction (see Figure 2.7). The results show that 
the slope is positive when high organizational-focused PR is combined with low industry 
distinctiveness (slope 3 in Figure 2.7) and negative when low organizational-focused PR 
is combined with low industry distinctiveness (slope 4 in Figure 2.7). However, the 
results of the significance test for slope difference shows no statistically significant 
difference in slopes 1 and 2, suggesting that the interaction with the focus of 
organizational communication only matters when the company undertakes competitive 
actions that are not too distinctive when compared to industry peers.  
To ensure the robustness of the results for the continuous measure of 
organizational celebrity, several steps were taken. First, to investigate the presence of 
influential observations that may be driving the results, I obtained the Cook’s D, and a 
leverage plot. Two observations seem to have the potential of affecting the results 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). I run the model again without these observations 
and the results remained essentially unchanged.17 Second, to detect heteroscedasticity, the 
hettest STATA command was used and the results suggest the need to obtain robust 




17 Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in 




standard errors. To test for multicollinearity, the VIFs were investigated. For model 5 
(only direct effects), all the VIFs were below 2.67 with an average of 1.48. For model 8 
(3-way interaction with strategic distinctiveness) the VIFs of two of the 2-way interaction 
terms were above the 10 threshold. Also, for model 9 (3-way interaction with industry 
distinctiveness) the VIFs of the interaction terms were above the 10 threshold (Kutner et 
al., 2004). This is not surprising given that the moderating variables are likely to be 
highly correlated with their product terms. To address the issue, the variables were mean 
centered for all the models presented in this essay.  
CEO Celebrity 
Hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, 4 and 5, test the probability that a company will have CEO 
celebrity contingent on the ratio of positively valued competitive actions it undertakes, 
the distinctiveness of those actions, the focus of its organizational communication 
materials, the CEO tenure, and the CEO founder role. To test the consistency of random 
effects estimator I run the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), comparing the differences 
between the coefficients estimated with the fixed effect, against the coefficients estimated 
with the random effects. The results indicate that the random effect would not result in 
consistent estimates and, therefore, fixed effects estimation should be used. A conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation model was used to address the incidental parameter 
problem (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The results using the strategic measure of 
distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.11, while the results using the industry measure of 
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distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.12.18 As discussed earlier, about 26% of 
companies that ever had CEO celebrity always had it over the time period considered in 
the panel, and 87.52% that did not have CEO celebrity never achieved it. Once again, 
given the estimation model, those observations cannot be included in the analysis, leading 
to a significant loss of efficiency (N= 1,424; n=116). 
Model 1 reports the results when only control variables and year fixed effects are 
accounted for. The greater the ratio of positive performance announcements, the greater 
the likelihood of organizational celebrity to occur (β=0.380, p=0.044). Following a one 
standard deviation increase in the ratio of positive performance announcements the odds 
of achieving celebrity increase to 1.462.  Also, organizational celebrity in the previous 
year has a positive effect on the likelihood of achieving CEO celebrity the following year 
(β= 0.636, p=0.004). Having organizational celebrity in the previous year increases the 
odds of achieving CEO the following year to 1.889. The number of awards received by a 
company in a given year, and the previous level of CEO celebrity, however, do not 
significantly affect the likelihood of CEO celebrity to occur.19  
In hypothesis 1b, I claim that the greater is the ratio of positively valued 
competitive actions the greater will be the likelihood of CEO celebrity to occur. To test 
this hypothesis, in Model 2 the ratio of positively valued competitive actions is added to 




18 Models 1 through 7 are equivalent in both tables. 
19 It is important to note once again that, given the estimation model, the sample could not include the 
observations that either never achieved or always maintained CEO celebrity during the time periods 
covered by the panel. This may explain why previous CEO celebrity does not significantly affect the 
likelihood of achieving celebrity the following year. 
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the equation. The results show no significant effect, providing no support for hypothesis 
1b. 
In hypothesis 2b, I suggest that the relationship between positively valued 
competitive actions and CEO celebrity is stronger for high levels of action 
distinctiveness. Model 8 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction 
term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions and strategic 
distinctiveness, while Model 8 in Table 2.12 considers an interaction effect with industry 
distinctiveness. In both cases, the interaction term is not significant, suggesting no 
support for hypothesis 2b.  
In hypothesis 3b, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued 
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger when the company focuses its 
communication materials at the CEO level. Model 9 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by 
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, 
strategic distinctiveness and CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not 
significant, suggesting no support for hypothesis 3b when strategic distinctiveness is 
considered. Model 9 in Table 2.12 tests hypothesis 3b by including an interaction term 
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and 
CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that there is 
not a 3-way interaction effect. Overall, therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 3b. 
In hypothesis 4, I claim that the combined effect of positively valued competitive 
actions and action distinctiveness on CEO celebrity is stronger the shorter the tenure of 
the CEO. Model 10 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction term 
99 
 
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and 
CEO tenure. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, suggesting no support for 
hypothesis 4. Model 10 in Table 2.12 tests hypothesis 4 by including an interaction term 
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and 
CEO tenure. The 3-way interaction term is not significant, indicating that there is not a 3-
way interaction effect. Overall, therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 4. 
Interestingly, however, CEO tenure seems to have a direct positive effect on CEO 
celebrity (β=0.455, p=0.002). Following a one standard deviation increase in the CEO 
tenure, the odds of achieving CEO celebrity increase to 1.577.  
In hypothesis 5, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued 
competitive actions and action distinctiveness on CEO celebrity is stronger when the 
CEO is also the founder of the company. Model 11 in Table 2.11 tests this hypothesis by 
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, 
strategic distinctiveness and CEO founder role. The 3-way interaction term is not 
significant, providing no support for hypothesis 5. Model 11 in Table 2.12 tests this 
hypothesis by including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued 
competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and CEO founder role. The 3-way 
interaction term is significant, providing partial and preliminary support for hypothesis 5. 
Moreover, the AIC fit statistic shows that the model fits the data better when compared to 
the model with only control variables (AIC=965.268; Pseudo R2=0.575). Therefore, 
further steps were taken to probe the nature of the interaction. First, I plotted the 3-way 
interaction to identify whether the slopes follow the hypothesized pattern (Aiken et al., 
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1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). The 2-way interaction between the ratio of positive 
competitive actions and industry distinctiveness is plotted in Figure 2.8 to provide a 
visual baseline. Contrary to hypothesis 2b, industry distinctiveness seems not to change 
the nature of the relationship between the ratio of positive competitive actions and the 
likelihood of CEO celebrity (the interaction term is not significant). Things change, 
however, when the CEO is also the founder of the organization. As shown in Figure 2.8, 
under the leadership of a founder CEO, and with low industry distinctiveness in the 
competitive choices of the organization, the relationship between ratio of positive 
competitive actions and CEO celebrity seems to be more positive, providing no support 
for hypothesis 5. 
Given the inherent limitations of interaction plots (Dawson & Richter, 2006), I 
took further steps to statistically probe the nature of this relationship. Specifically, I 
conducted a subgroup analysis (Aiken et al., 1991; Peters et al., 1984), dividing the 
sample on the CEO founder role variable. The effects of the ratio of positive competitive 
actions and its interaction with industry distinctiveness were tested on the subsample of 
observations with founder CEOs and non-founder ones separately. The results (reported 
in Table 2.1320) show that the interaction term between the ratio of positive competitive 
actions and industry distinctiveness is significant only for the CEO founder group. 




20 Given the loss of efficiency following the use of the conditional maximum likelihood estimator with 
fixed effects (necessary to consistently estimate fixed effects non-linear models) previously discussed, this 
further analysis was conducted with pooled-OLS estimation, adding year, industry, and company type fixed 
effects and using cluster-robust standard errors. 
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However, the direction of the interaction is not in the hypothesized direction, providing 
no support for hypothesis 5.  
Robustness Analyses 
To investigate the presence of influential observations that may be driving the 
results, I obtained a plot of leverage points (Pregibon, 1981). From the scatterplot, three 
observations seem to have the potential of affecting the results. I run the model again 
without these observations and the results remained substantially unchanged.21 To correct 
for heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were computed using the vce (Jackknife) 
option. The lag-1 stationary autocorrelation of the residuals for company-year pairs range 
from .104 to -.074, with an average of .022. This provides a rough estimate of the 
interclass stationary correlation coefficient of the residuals. To test for multicollinearity, 
the VIFs were investigated. For model 7 (only direct effects), all the VIFs were all below 
2.27 with an average of 1.53. For model 11 (3-way interaction with industry 
distinctiveness) the VIFs were all below 2.27, with an average of 1.51. These values are 
well below the 10 threshold (Kutner et al., 2004) and show that multicollinearity is not a 
concern. To investigate the potential for a misspecification in the model, the linktest 
STATA command was used. The results indicate that the model is properly specified.  
Once again, considering the significant efficiency loss caused by the conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation with fixed effects, a further analysis was conducted using 




21 Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in 
Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers are 
available upon request.  
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the continuous data for CEO celebrity. The analysis was conducted with fixed effects 
estimation (following the results of the Hausman test), and robust standard errors. The 
results for strategic distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.14, while the results for 
industry distinctiveness are reported in Table 2.15. 22 
In model 1 only the control variables were entered. The results show that 
organizational celebrity in the previous year has a positive effect on CEO celebrity the 
following year (β=0.364, p=0.001), and previous levels of CEO celebrity has a 
marginally significant positive effect (β=0.239, p=0.098). Surprisingly, the number of 
awards won by a company in a given year has a negative effect on CEO celebrity (β=-
0.269, p=.009), while the ratio of positive performance announcements does not affect 
CEO celebrity. Given that counterintuitive effect of number of awards of organizational 
celebrity, further steps were taken to identify the causes of this negative effect. 
Specifically, the data show that of the 3245 company-year observations, 2375 did not 
receive any awards. When considering only the observations with at least one award, the 
average number of awards is 2.8. Also, I checked the distributions of the number of 
award variable against industry condes to identify whether in certain industries awards 
are more common than in others. All the observations that score higher than 14 on the 
award variable are from the same industry (SIC – 73). Also, I investigated a sample of 83 
award news from the RavenPack database, for the observations that scored high on the 
award variable. The vast majority of the awards refer to highly specific product-service 




22 Models 1 through 7 are equivalent in both tables. 
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awards that would be unlikely to generate the type of dramatize realities in media 
coverage that foster the development of celebrity. Moreover, I run the analyses without 
the companies in this industry and the number of award variable become not significant. 
These findings suggest that the frequency of awards within certain industries makes them 
less relevant in attracting high level of media attention.  
In Model 2, the ratio of positively valued competitive actions is added to the 
equation. The results show no support for hypothesis 1b (β=0.016, p=0.397) and the AIC 
statistic and R2 show that the overall model does not fit the data better than model 1. 
Also, contrary to current theory on celebrity, strategic (β= -.030, p=.035) and industry 
distinctiveness (β= -0.033, p=0.027) seem to have a negative effect on CEO celebrity.  
To test for hypothesis 2b, model 8 in Table 2.14 considers the interaction between 
the ratio of positive competitive actions and strategic distinctiveness, finding a significant 
effect (β= -0.028, p=.022). To further probe the nature of this relationship and provide a 
visual representation, I plotted the different slopes (Aiken et al., 1991; Jaccard & Turrisi, 
2003). The graphs (see Figure 2.9) show that, contrary to expectations, for high strategic 
distinctiveness the relationship between the ratio of positive competitive actions and CEO 
celebrity is weaker. The effect is statistically significant; however, the slopes seem to 
imply a low practical relevance of the effect. 
Model 8 in Table 2.15 considers the interaction between the ratio of positive 
competitive actions and industry distinctiveness. The interaction term is not significant, 
providing no support for hypothesis 2b when industry distinctiveness is considered. 
Overall, the ratio of positively valued competitive actions interacts with strategic 
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distinctiveness but not with industry distinctiveness in affecting CEO celebrity. Yet, the 
effect has small practical relevance and is also not in the predicted direction, providing no 
support for hypotheses 2b. 
In hypothesis 3b, I suggest that the combined effect of positively valued 
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger when the company focuses its 
communication materials at the CEO level. Model 9 in Table 2.14 tests this hypothesis by 
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, 
strategic distinctiveness and CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not 
significant, suggesting no support for hypothesis 3b when strategic distinctiveness is 
considered. Model 9 in Table 2.15 tests hypothesis 3b by including an interaction term 
between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, industry distinctiveness and 
CEO-focused PR. The 3-way interaction term is not significant. Overall, therefore, I find 
no support for hypothesis 3b. 
In hypothesis 4, I sustain that the combined effect of positively valued 
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger for shorter tenured CEOs. 
Model 10 in Table 2.14 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction term between the 
ratio of positively valued competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and CEO tenure. 
The 3-way interaction term is not significant, suggesting no support for hypothesis 4 
when strategic distinctiveness is considered. Model 10 in Table 2.15 tests hypothesis 4 by 
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, 
industry distinctiveness and CEO tenure. The 3-way interaction term is not significant. 
Overall, therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 4. 
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In hypothesis 5, I theorize that the combined effect of positively valued 
competitive actions and action distinctiveness is stronger for founder CEOs. Model 11 in 
Table 2.14 tests this hypothesis by including an interaction term between the ratio of 
positively valued competitive actions, strategic distinctiveness and CEO founder role. 
The 3-way interaction term is not significant, providing no support for hypothesis 5 when 
strategic distinctiveness is considered. Model 11 in Table 2.15 tests hypothesis 5 by 
including an interaction term between the ratio of positively valued competitive actions, 
industry distinctiveness and CEO founder role. The 3-way interaction term is significant 
(β= -.176, p=.050). To probe the nature of this relationship, I plotted the interaction in 
Figure 2.9. The effect of the ratio of positive competitive actions on CEO celebrity is 
positive when the CEO is also the founder and the organization undertakes competitive 
actions that are not distinctive when compared to industry norms (slope 3). On the other 
hand, the effect is negative when the CEO is not the founder and the organization 
undertakes competitive actions that are not distinctive when compared to industry norms 
(slope 4). The slopes seem to suggest no significant relationship when founder role is 
combined with high industry distinctiveness (slope 1), and when not-founder role is 
combined with high industry distinctiveness (slope 2). Lastly, I also conducted a 
significance test for slope differences (Dawson & Richter, 2006). The results indicate that 
there is a significant difference between the slopes for high and low industry 
distinctiveness (slope 2 vs. slope 4) if the CEO is not the founder. Also, the slope for low 
industry distinctiveness and CEO founder (slope 3) is statistically different from the slope 
for low industry distinctiveness and non-founder CEOs (slope 4). However, the slope for 
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high industry distinctiveness and CEO founder (slope 1) is not statistically different from 
the slope for high industry distinctiveness and not-founder CEOs (slope 2). The slope for 
high industry distinctiveness under a founder CEO (slope 1) is only marginally 
significantly different from the slope for low industry distinctiveness under both founder 
(slope 3) and not-founder CEOs (slope 4), and the slope for high industry distinctiveness 
under a not-founder CEO (slope 2) is only marginally significantly different from the 
slope for low industry distinctiveness under a founder CEO (slope 3).  Overall, therefore, 
there seems to be a significant interaction effect between ratio of positive competitive 
actions, founder role and industry distinctiveness, but not when strategic distinctiveness 
is considered. However, the relationship is not in the hypothesized direction, providing 
no support for hypothesis 5.  
To ensure the robustness of the results for the continuous measure of CEO 
celebrity, several steps were taken. First, to investigate the presence of influential 
observations that may be driving the results, I obtained the Cook’s D and a leverage plot 
(Cohen et al., 2003). Three observations seem to have the potential of affecting the 
results. I run the model again without these observations and the results remained 
substantially unchanged.23 Second, to detect heteroscedasticity, the hettest STATA 
command was used and the results suggest the need to obtain robust standard errors. To 
test for multicollinearity, the VIFs were investigated. For model 7 (only direct effects), all 




23 Given that the results remain substantially unchanged and in the interest of brevity, the results reported in 
Table 2.14 and Table 2.15 refer to the analyses without outliers. The results including the outliers are 
available upon request.  
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the VIFs were below 2.70 with an average of 1.39. For model 11 (3-way interaction with 
industry distinctiveness) the VIFs were below 2.82, with an average of 1.45. These values 
are well below that 10 threshold (Cohen et al., 2003) and show that multicollinearity is 
not a concern.  
The findings are summarized in Table 2.16. 
Discussion 
Celebrity is an important social approval asset (Pfarrer et al., 2010) that can 
emerge at both the individual (Hayward et al., 2004) and organizational level (Rindova et 
al., 2006). Defined as social actors that attract high levels of public attention and elicit 
positive emotional responses (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016), celebrities achieve it through 
the mediating role of the media (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2016; Zavyalova et al., 2016a).  
Within the management field, celebrity has been studied at both the individual 
and organizational level. The vast majority of empirical work has focused on 
investigating the consequences of this social approval asset. Specifically, research has 
empirically examined the effects of CEO and organizational celebrity on individual (see: 
Graffin et al., 2013a; Kjærgaard et al., 2011; Wade et al., 2006) and organizational level 
outcomes (see: Cho et al., 2016; Graffin & Ward, 2010; Love, Lim, & Bednar, 2016; 
Pfarrer et al., 2010; Wade et al., 2006). Most of the work on the antecedents of celebrity, 
instead, has advanced our theoretical understanding of the construct (Hayward et al., 
2004; Rindova et al., 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2016a) but has lacked empirical 
investigation of such theoretical claims. Moreover, research on celebrity has lacked 
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investigations of the distinctive antecedents of this important social approval asset at the 
individual- and organizational-level.  
In this essay, I addressed these gaps in the literature and studied the antecedents 
of both CEO and organizational celebrity on a sample of 244 organizations over 15 years. 
This is important as previous research has showed that celebrity has important 
organizational implications, and such implications are different when celebrity is at the 
CEO or organizational level. In the remaining of this section, I further discuss the 
theoretical contributions and practical implications of this study, as well as its limitations 
and opportunities for future developments.  
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications  
Investigating antecedents of both organizational and CEO celebrity, this essay 
provides multiple theoretical contributions and bears several practical implications. In the 
remaining of this section, I first discuss the theoretical contributions and practical 
implications of the findings on organizational celebrity, then I precede with the 
discussion of the findings on CEO celebrity.  
Organizational Celebrity 
The findings in this essay support some prior theorizing about organizational 
celebrity, but calls into question other key tenets of the theory, suggesting the need for 
new theory.  
First, the results of this essay show that the greater a company’s focus on positive 
competitive actions, the more likely is the emergence of organizational celebrity. 
Contrary to current theory, however, the distinctiveness of those competitive actions does 
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not increase their efficacy in affecting the emergence of organizational celebrity. 
Moreover, when looking at the direct effects of distinctiveness on the levels of positively 
charged media coverage, both strategic and industry distinctiveness may become 
counterproductive in attracting high levels of positively charged media coverage at the 
organizational level. Action distinctiveness by itself is either not important or even 
detrimental for the development of organizational celebrity.  
These findings suggest that, contrary to current theory on celebrity the business 
media are inclined to report more, and more positively, about the status quo than about 
change events. Companies that diverge from their strategic history and from industry 
norms are at a disadvantage when it comes to attracting high levels of positive media 
coverage. This may be due to the fact that by acting highly distinctively, organizations 
lose legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999). It follows that organizations may be better off 
seeking strategic balance between distinctiveness and isomorphism, not only to directly 
increase performance (Deephouse, 1999), but also to achieve organizational celebrity. 
These findings extend theory on celebrity as they highlight how companies cannot 
invite organizational celebrity by only acting in distinctive ways (Rindova et al., 2006). 
Also, they suggest the need to exercise caution in using a wide brush to paint a picture of 
what constitutes news, independently from the context. Research in mass communication 
suggests that the media focus attention on “obtrusive events” (Rindova et al., 2006) that 
depart from expectations (Lippmann, 1922); however, the business media seems to be 
more inclined to report positively about organizations that do not act distinctively, at least 
when competitive actions are considered. From a practical stand point, these results seem 
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to suggest that salience (through distinctiveness) is less relevant than accessibility 
(through volume of positive actions) in achieving organizational celebrity; through 
engaging in more positively valued competitive actions, organizations become more 
accessible in journalists’ minds and are more likely to achieve celebrity.  
Second, the results show that things change depending upon the narrative frames 
that an organization promotes in its communication to the media. These frames not only 
have a direct effect on the volume and positivity of media coverage about an 
organization, but also moderate the relationship between celebrity and competitive 
actions. Specifically, the results show that when such communication materials are 
prevalently focused at the organizational level, positive and highly distinctive 
competitive actions increase both the likelihood of achieving organizational celebrity as 
well as the positivity and volume of media coverage received by an organization. On the 
other hand, when such communication materials are not prevalently focused at the 
organizational level, regardless of the distinctiveness level of the competitive actions, the 
odds of achieving organizational celebrity do not increase with competitive actions, and 
the positivity and volume of media attention actually decreases.  
These findings imply that “standing out through nonconforming strategic actions” 
(Rindova et al., 2006: 59) is not enough to invite organizational celebrity unless an 
organization provides the media with the appropriate frames to interpret those actions 
(Rindova et al., 2006). In line with previous theory, therefore, I find that both competitive 
actions and impression management efforts are important factors in affecting 
organizational celebrity; yet the data show that more than acting independently, these two 
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factors work together in fostering the development of organizational celebrity, and 
distinctive competitive actions without the appropriate communication activities are not 
as relevant as previously theorized. Ultimately, therefore, actions speak louder than 
words only if they are interpreted the ‘right’ way; and this ‘right’ interpretation is 
facilitated by organizational framing strategies. From a practical stand point, these 
findings suggest that particular attention needs to be dedicated to the frames provided in 
the organizational communication materials.  
Third, contrary to predictions, the results on the continuous measure of 
organizational celebrity show that such framing activities have the strongest impact for 
low levels of distinctiveness. These results seem to suggest that the level of 
distinctiveness activates different cognitive processes in the journalists’ minds. 
Individuals tend to rely on either relatively automatic or controlled metal processes 
contingent on their motivations and the situation (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). It is possible 
that less distinctive actions activate more automatic cognitive processes in the journalists’ 
minds and, therefore, are interpreted relying more heavily on organizational 
communication materials. On the other hand, organizational actions that are more 
distinctive may activate more effortful mental processes, reducing the media reliance on 
organizational communication materials and, therefore, weakening the efficacy of the 
frames in those communication materials. The results seem to suggest that the salience of 
distinctive actions activates journalists’ attention and by doing so, it stimulates less 
passive reliance on organizational communication materials.  
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Previous research shows that firms undertaking distinctive actions engage more 
heavily in impression management activities and are “more concerned with managing the 
interpretative frames stakeholders use to evaluate their actions” (Rindova et al., 2006: 
62). Research in mass communication shows that these information subsides are used by 
journalists as they save time and reduce the costs associated with producing a news story 
(Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001; Rindova et al., 2006; Tuchman, 1978). Yet, the results of 
this essay show that such impression management activities are less effective when 
organizations undertake highly distinctive actions. This contributes to corporate and mass 
communication theory suggesting that the obtrusiveness of the events to be reported 
reduces the tendency of journalists to reinforce familiar explanations by gathering few 
accounts of additional supporting evidence, rather than actively seeking disconfirming 
ones (Hayward et al., 2004), affecting the overall efficacy of organizational 
communication materials. From a practical stand point, these results show that to attain 
more and more favorable media coverage at the organizational level, organizations 
should not underestimate the importance of impression management efforts especially 
when they are not undertaking highly distinctive actions.  
CEO celebrity 
This essay represents a first attempt to empirically test theoretical claims about 
CEO celebrity and the formation of the media attributions affecting the development of 
this important social approval asset.  
First, in line with current theory on CEO celebrity, the results of this essay show 
that it is positively related to positive performance announcements and previous levels of 
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organizational celebrity. Also, the data show that the frames provided in the 
organizational communication materials to the media have a strong direct effect on CEO 
celebrity. However, competitive actions, independently from their level of 
distinctiveness, do not foster the likelihood of achieving CEO celebrity. These findings 
contribute to theory on CEO celebrity as they show that while competitive actions and 
their distinctiveness are not particularly important for the development of celebrity at the 
individual level, the availability of information about the CEO in the organizational 
communication materials is a strong predictor of CEO celebrity. These results imply that 
to invite CEO celebrity, organizations are better off focusing on framing activities of their 
communication materials.  
Second, the results also suggest that longer tenured CEOs have a greater 
likelihood of achieving CEO celebrity. Research shows that “long-tenured CEOs often 
accumulate much power and legitimacy. There are two possible explanations for these 
findings. First, long-tenured CEOs develop the freedom to centralize strategy making and 
the confidence to make key decisions unilaterally” (Miller, 1993: 645),as they are less 
concerned with building consensus behind their strategic plan and less dependent on 
other administrators to obtain support and information (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).  
The results of this essay suggest that this increase in power and legitimacy fosters the 
development of larger-than-human expectations among journalists as they develop their 
narratives, increasing the likelihood of CEO celebrity to emerge. Second, tenure itself can 
be interpreted as a sign of correctness and success, as CEOs are generally allowed to keep 
their positions as long as their performance is acceptable (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).  
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These increased perceptions of success seem to affect media coverage in such a way that 
the longer the tenure of the CEO the greater the likelihood of CEO celebrity. These 
findings advance current theory on individual celebrity as they suggest that not only 
behavioral elements, but also intrinsic characteristics of the CEO foster the achievement 
of celebrity at the individual level. From a practical standpoint, this research shows that 
organizations under the leadership of a long tenured CEO may need to place particular 
attention on the framing of their communications materials. 
Third, the results show that competitive actions are not relevant in determining 
CEO celebrity, and the distinctiveness of those actions not only does not increase the 
odds of achieving CEO celebrity, but also is negatively related to the volume and 
positivity of media coverage about the CEO. Also, this effect is not moderated by the 
tenure of the CEO, providing no support for the idea that when a company acts 
distinctively in temporal proximity with the appointment of a new CEO, attributions at 
the individual-level are more likely to emerge in media narratives (Hayward et al., 2004). 
Overall, the media seem to adopt the frames provided in the organizational 
communication materials and information about the CEO tenure, without triangulating 
this information with facts about an organization’s competitive actions and their 
distinctiveness.  
Lastly, the findings show that when the CEO is also the founder, this impacts the 
effectiveness of distinctive competitive actions to foster CEO celebrity. Specifically, 
contrary to predictions, the findings show that CEO celebrity is more likely to emerge 
when the organization undertakes more positive competitive actions that are not highly 
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distinctive from industry norms under the leadership of a founder-CEO. These results 
show that the greater the accessibility of an individual attributional frame – made 
possible by the presence of a founder CEO – the greater is the likelihood of CEO 
celebrity to emerge only if the organization undertakes more positive actions that are not 
highly distinctive from industry norms. These findings seem to suggest that when highly 
distinctive actions are undertaken, journalists may engage in more active cognitive 
processes and seek to acquire more evidence about attributional claims to incorporate in 
their reporting. On the other hand, when the organization undertakes low distinctive 
actions, journalists are more likely to engage in automatic cognitive processing and more 
readily adopt the more available individual level frame. Once again, these findings call 
into questions some key tenets of CEO celebrity theory while suggesting important new 
extensions. Specifically, the results suggest that competitive actions and their 
characteristics have a marginal role in determining CEO celebrity, while individual level 
characteristics, specifically CEO tenure and founder status, play an important role in 
fostering the development of this social approval asset.    
Summary 
To summarize, this essay advance current theory on celebrity by empirically 
investigating whether “standing out through nonconforming strategic actions” (Rindova 
et al., 2006: 59) affects the likelihood of achieving this important social approval asset at 
both the individual and organizational level. Second, this essay advances current theory 
on celebrity by identifying individual level characteristics that beyond behavioral factors, 
may affect the emergence of CEO celebrity. Third, this essay contributes to theory on 
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celebrity by highlighting how distinctiveness may reduce the adoption by journalists of 
attributional frames that are made readily available by impression management activities 
or by CEO’s characteristics. Lastly, this essay advance research on media within 
organizational studies. Research in mass communication suggests that the media focus 
attention on obtrusive events (Rindova et al., 2006). In contrast, the results of this study 
suggest that the business media seems to be more inclined to report positively about 
organizations that do not act highly distinctively, at least when competitive actions are 
considered.  
Methodological Contributions 
This essay also provides multiple methodological contributions. Research on 
social approval assets such as status, legitimacy, reputation, and celebrity, has flourished 
within the field of organizational studies. While intense theoretical efforts have highlight 
different theoretical underpinnings, socio-cognitive foundations, as well as different 
development processes for these different intangible resources (Rindova et al., 2006; 
Zavyalova et al., 2016a), empirical studies are characterized by a certain degree of 
ambiguity in the operationalization of these different constructs. Often times the same 
measure (e.g. CEO certification / awards contest) is used to operationalize different social 
approval assets – e.g. celebrity (Cho et al., 2016), status (Graffin et al., 2008), reputation 
(Boivie, Graffin, & Gentry, 2016). Such tendencies, ultimately, may humper not only our 
understanding of how these diverse social approval assets differently affect 
organizational processes and outcomes (Pfarrer et al., 2010), but also our ability to 
identify the idiosyncratic characteristics of their development processes. Building on the 
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role of media as the distinctive characteristic of celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006) and on 
established standards in the study of organizational celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010), I used 
a complementary measure of CEO celebrity. Furthermore, the use of distinctive and 
complementary measures for the operationalization of CEO and organizational celebrity 
will facilitate future research on the construct at multiple levels.  
Second, the data show little mobility of celebrity, with about half of the 
observations never achieved or always had celebrity over the time considered by the 
panel. This is in line with an investigation on the mobility of fame by van de Rijt and 
colleagues (Van de Rijt et al., 2013). Using daily data about the references of persons’ 
names in a large corpus of media sources, they found that celebrity exhibits strong 
continuity and, once established, it seems to persist over time, being less ephemeral than 
originally thought (Van de Rijt et al., 2013). Under these circumstances, the estimation 
model needed for the dichotomous operationalization of celebrity, causes a significant 
loss of efficiency, suggesting that in these situations a continuous operationalization may 
be preferred. Also, by preserving the variance in media coverage, the continuous measure 
may allow for a more fine-grained understanding of the dynamics leading to celebrity at 
the individual or organizational level.  
Limitations and Future Developments 
Some of the limitations of this essay also provide opportunities for future 
research. First, in this essay I investigate the effect of competitive actions on the 
development of celebrity at the individual and organizational levels. Although this 
approach has the advantage of exploring how a diverse set of organizational events 
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affects the development of this important social approval asset, other organizational 
events may be equally important in fostering its development. Specifically, new theory on 
celebrity suggests that it develops as “information about elements that are salient and 
socially significant” are made available to the media (Zavyalova et al., 2016a: 4). By 
measuring the distinctiveness in competitive actions, I investigated how ‘salient’ actions 
affect the development of celebrity. However, competitive actions may not be as ‘socially 
significant’ as other organizational initiatives, such as stands on political or social issues. 
Such types of actions are also likely to draw media attention to an organization and its 
leadership. Future research may be needed to understand how other types of actions, 
beyond competitive ones, affect the development of individual or organizational 
celebrity.   
Second, research on deviance has argued that regardless of the objective 
characteristics of the behavior (being overconforming – i.e. behaviors that objectively 
positively deviate from the norm –  or underconforming – i.e. behaviors that objectively 
negatively deviate from the norm) the social evaluations of the behavior (positive or 
negative) is also important in determining deviance (Rindova et al., 2006). Following 
these considerations, I focused on positively evaluated competitive actions (as measured 
by the RavenPack’s Event Sentiment Score). Nevertheless, I did not distinguish between 
overconforming  and underconforming behaviors (Rindova et al., 2006). It is possible 
that positively evaluated underconforming behaviors – i.e. deviance admiration (Rindova 
et al., 2006) – act differently than positively evaluated overconforming behaviors – i.e. 
positive deviance  –  in attracting the positive media attention needed to develop CEO 
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and organizational celebrity. Therefore, future research is needed to investigate if and 
how different types of deviance affect the development of celebrity. 
Lastly, the use of archival data, although relatively common in the study of 
celebrity, does not allow for direct investigation of how journalists develop attributions. 
Rather, it focuses on the outcome of this process. Future studies may further develop our 
understanding of how organizational and CEO celebrity develop by employing 
experimental approaches or through direct observations and other qualitative methods. 
This would allow a more direct test of the process through which journalists develop 
causal attributions and how such frames are incorporated in their reporting.  
Conclusion 
Building on previous work on CEO (Hayward et al., 2004) and organizational 
celebrity (Rindova et al., 2006), and integrating attribution (Kelley, 1973) and framing 
theory (Entman, 1993), this essay investigates factors that affect the likelihood of CEO 
and organizational celebrity to emerge. The findings show that, contrary to current 
theory, the distinctiveness of competitive actions does not facilitate the development of 
celebrity at either level, unless other information is made available to journalists 
increasing the availability of specific attributional frames. Overall, the findings suggest 
that further empirical research on the antecedents of celebrity at the organizational and 
individual level is very much needed to test and advance the theoretical claims on these 
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Figure 2.3. Conceptual model: CEO celebrity.  
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High Media Visibility 91 48 43
SIC: 20; 27; 28; 35
Average Media Visibility 61 56 5
SIC: 48; 49; 73; 23
Low Media Visibility 92 54 38
SIC: 26; 36; 50; 51; 55
Total 244 158 86
SIC: 20 - Food & Kindred Products
SIC: 23 - Apparel & Other Textile Products
SIC: 26 - Paper & Allied Products
SIC: 27 - Printing & Publishing
SIC: 28 - Chemical & Allied Products
SIC: 35 - Industrial Machinery & Equipment
SIC: 36 - Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
SIC: 48 - Communications
SIC: 49 - Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services
SIC: 50 - Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods
SIC: 51 - Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods
SIC: 55 - Automotive Dealers & Service Stations
SIC: 73 - Business Services
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Table 2.2. Types of competitive actions and headlines examples.  
 
  
Action Category RavenPack Classification Company Headline
Acquisition Completed Acquirer Calpine Corp. Calpine Closes On Acquisition Of Champion 
Energy >CPN
Unit-acquisition Acquirer Microsoft Corp. Microsoft buys VoloMetrix to boost data 
analytics in Office 365
Acquisition Completed Acquirer Corning Inc. Corning Completes Acquisition of iBwave 
Software Design Company
Partnership E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. Neo Solar Power and DuPont Signed 
Technology Cooperation Agreement
Partnership Airbnb Inc. NRG Home Solar Partners With Airbnb To 
Boost Rooftop Solar
Partnership Terminated eBay Inc. PayPal ends business relationship with Mega
Facility Open IBM Corp. IBM Opens New Cloud Center in Quebec
Facility Close Pfizer Inc. Pfizer To Shut Cambridge Site: 120 Jobs May 
Go
Facility Upgrade PPG Industries Inc. PPG Industries Completes Expansion of 
Facility in Brazil - Analyst Blog
Product Release MuleSoft Inc. MuleSoft Expands API-Led Connectivity With 
Major New Release of Anypoint Platform
Product Release Dean Foods Co. Dean Foods unveils DairyPure milk
Product Release Texas Instruments Inc. TI unveils new informational advanced driver 
assistance systems SDK
Campaign Ad Release Intel Corp. Intel Unveils First Commercial 14 Nanometer 
Processor
Campaign Ad Release PepsiCo Inc. Pepsi launch 2015 Nations Cup campaign 
ahead of event kick-off
Campaign Ad Retired Coca-Cola Co. Coca-Cola ends automated Twitter campaign 
after it tweets parts of Mein Kampf read 
comments
Investment Qualcomm Inc. Audi and Qualcomm invest €18m in Irish start-
up Cubic Telecom
Investment Google Inc. Google Invested $900 Million in SpaceX
Investment Motorola Solutions Inc. Motorola Solutions Invests in Drone Maker 
CyPhy Works
Product Price Cut Uber Inc. Uber cuts fares by up to 40% in India
Product Price Cut Oracle Corp. Oracle Slashes Prices on New Servers Starting 
Price War
Product Price Raise Air Products & Chemicals Inc. Air Products (APD) to Hike Prices of Products 
& Services - Analyst Blog
Patent Infringment Plaintiff 3M Co. 3M Files Patent Suit Vs Dental Direkt GmbH
Legal Issues Plaintiff Procter & Gamble Co. Gillette sues Dollar Shave Club over blades
Legal Issues Plaintiff Eastman Chemical Co. Rayonier and Eastman sue each other over 












Table 2.3. Awards and Ratio of Positive Performance control variables with 
headlines examples.  
 
Control RavenPack Classification Company Headline
Products Services Award Bemis Co. Inc. Bemis Receives Gold and Silver Achievement 
Awards from the Flexible Packaging Association
Products Services Award Yahoo! Inc. Yahoo Wins Data Center Energy Efficiency 
Award Utilizing Cooling Optimization and 
Control Solution from SynapSense, a Panduit 
Company
Products Services Award 3M Co. 3M Named as a World's Most Ethical Company 
for Second Consecutive Year
Revenue Above Expectations Exelon Corp. Exelon's 3Q15 Revenue Beat Consensus 
Estimates
Earnings Up Dean Foods Co. MW Dean Foods swings to profit, beats 
expectations
Earnings Below Expectations CenterPoint Energy Inc. (CNP) CENTERPOINT EGY Q2 Revenue 
$1.532B, -15.0% Surprise
Earnings Down PepsiCo Inc. MW PepsiCo. Q3 net income slumps 73% to 
$533 million
Earnings Up R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. R.R. Donnelley Turns To Profit In Q1; Backs 
2015 Net Sales Outlook - Quick Facts
Awards
















Mean Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Overall Between Within
1 CEO Celebrity (dichotomous) 0.135 0.342 0.221 0.262 0 1 1.000
2 Organizational Celebrity (dichotomous) 0.162 0.3682 0.252 0.260 0 1 0.395
*** 1.000
3 CEO Celebrity (continous) 0.017 2.027 1.352 1.389 -0.772 40.201 0.551
*** 0.378 *** 1.000
4 Organizational Celebrity (continous) 0.019 2.054 1.451 1.298 -0.439 35.697 0.350
*** 0.397 *** 0.756 *** 1.000
5 CEO Celebrity (dichotomous) t-1 0.129 0.335 0.207 0.253 0 1 0.430
*** 0.410 *** 0.409 *** 0.354 *** 1.000
6 Organizational Celebrity (dichotomous) t-1 0.156 0.363 0.241 0.257 0 1 0.410
*** 0.507 *** 0.376 *** 0.360 *** 0.416 *** 1.000
7 Industry Visibility 1.991 0.844 0.868 0 1 3 0.118
*** 0.159 *** 0.047 ** 0.022 0.109 *** 0.152 *** 1.000
8 Firm Type (F500) 0.785 0.411 0.479 0 0 1 0.058
** 0.146 *** 0.093 *** 0.096 *** 0.104 *** 0.167 *** -0.070 ***
9 Awards 0.813 1.959 1.261 1.421 0 23 0.220
*** 0.243 *** 0.255 *** 0.271 *** 0.250 *** 0.269 *** -0.028
10 Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements 0.579 0.377 0.368 0.19 0 1 0.081
*** 0.152 *** 0.105 *** 0.111 *** 0.110 *** 0.155 *** -0.051 **
11 Tenure 5.458 5.604 3.683 4.028 0 38 0.077
*** 0.010 0.114 *** -0.001 0.063 *** 0.002 -0.014
12 Founder Role 0.214 0.410 0.453 0.137 0 1 -0.002 -0.103
*** -0.036 * -0.071 *** -0.045 * -0.124 *** 0.054 ***
13 Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions 0.540 0.401 0.342 0.248 0 1 0.155
*** 0.236 *** 0.155 *** 0.148 *** 0.196 *** 0.238 *** 0.011
14 Strategic Distinctiveness 0.270 0.410 0.237 0.333 0 2 -0.128
*** -0.133 *** -0.099 *** -0.089 *** -0.119 *** -0.127 *** -0.070 ***
15 Industry Distinctiveness 0.271 0.242 0.145 0.189 0 1.5 -0.190
*** -0.259 *** -0.175 *** -0.166 *** -0.216 *** -0.240 *** -0.167 ***
16 Organizational-focused PR 32.516 76.349 63.494 33.158 0 996 0.416
*** 0.442 *** 0.600 *** 0.693 *** 0.421 *** 0.447 *** -0.012 ***
17 CEO-focused PR 3.657 5.995 4.257 4.017 0 41 0.127
*** 0.082 *** 0.111 *** 0.115 *** 0.132 *** 0.078 *** -0.000 ***
N=2,999 ; n=244
a




Table 2.4. (Continued). 
 
 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
8 Firm Type (F500) 1.000
9 Awards 0.213
*** 1.000
10 Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements 0.800
*** 0.192 *** 1.000
11 Tenure 0.075
*** 0.069 *** 0.086 *** 1.000
12 Founder Role -0.846
*** -0.171 *** -0.676 *** 0.118 *** 1.000
13 Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions 0.627
*** 0.284 *** 0.594 *** 0.047 ** -0.539 *** 1.000
14 Strategic Distinctiveness 0.289
*** -0.150 *** 0.261 *** 0.034 † -0.243 *** 0.164 *** 1.000
15 Industry Distinctiveness -0.138
*** -0.254 *** -0.114 *** 0.004 0.110 *** -0.290 *** 0.438 *** 1.000
16 Organizational-focused PR 0.212
*** 0.487 *** 0.192 *** 0.021 -0.146 *** 0.275 *** 0.124 *** 0.267 *** 1.000
17 CEO-focused PR 0.273
*** 0.151 *** 0.245 *** -0.027 -0.258 *** 0.227 *** 0.065 *** 0.089 *** 0.312 ***
N=2,999 ; n=244
a
  *** p<=.001; ** p<=.01; * p<=.05; † p<.10
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Table 2.5. Within and Between Summaries. 
 
 




Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Percent
No 2737 84.35% 239 97.95% 87.44%
Yes 508 15.65% 117 47.95% 29.92%
Total 3245 100.00% 356 145.90% 68.54%
No 2825 87.06% 243 99.59% 87.52%
Yes 420 12.94% 119 48.77% 26.33%






No Yes No Yes
No 2327 206 2408 206
91.87% 8.13% 92.12% 7.88%
Yes 189 279 187 200







Table 2.7. Fixed effects logit results predicting Organizational Celebrity. a, b, c, d, e 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Awards -0.149 -0.151 -0.154 -0.154 -0.165 -0.165 -0.162 -0.168 -0.140
(0.126) (0.127) (0.126) (0.228) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.129) (0.128)


















(0.152) (0.153) (0.152) -0.152 (0.155) (0.156) (0.154) (0.163) (0.157)
Tenure 0.167 0.165 0.168 0.168 0.171 0.176 0.170 0.171 0.173
(0.137) (0.138) (0.139) (0.140) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.142)
Founder Role -0.802 -0.799 -0.813 -0.856 -0.927 -0.956 -0.936 -1.073 -1.010
(0.721) (0.720) (0.711) -0.703 (0.695) (0.699) (0.699) (0.709) (0.738)


















(0.230) (0.227) (0.228) -0.228 (0.233) (0.232) (0.234) (0.237) (0.236)
Organizational celebrity (t-1) 0.108 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.077 0.100 0.085 0.053 0.050
(0.146) (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.149) (0.149) (0.153) (0.152)













(0.124) (0.131) (0.137) (0.138) (0.143) (0.139) (0.167) (0.154)
Strategic Distinctiveness -0.182 -0.113 -0.114 -0.193 -0.125 -0.577
*
-0.133
(0.124) (0.138) (0.139) (0.193) (0.143) (0.229) (0.147)
Industry Distinctiveness -0.184 -0.173 -0.184 -0.229 -0.199 -0.346
*
(0.140) (0.139) (0.145) (0.181) (0.139) (0.173)
Organizational-focused PR 0.303 0.305 0.305 0.062 -0.003























































AIC 1012.420 1011.073 1010.568 1010.444 1009.843 1010.598 1010.869 1007.216 1010.507













 Jackknife Standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Fixed effect estimation.
e
 Two outliers were excluded from the analysis.
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X 
Strategic Distinctiveness
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X 
Industry Distinctiveness
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X 
Organizational-focused PR
Strategic Distinctiveness X 
Organizational-focused PR
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR







a Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.7 (Model 8).  
Figure 2.4. Fixed effects logit slopes predicting Organizational Celebrity. a 
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Table 2.8. Subgroup analysis on median-split samples for Organizational Celebrity 
(2 subgroups). a, b, c, d, e  
Awards -0.066 -0.381
(0.133) (0.188)






Founder Role -1.144 -0.512
(0.876) (1.394)




Organizational Celebrity (t-1) -0.024 -0.191
(0.206) (0.416)
Industry Distinctiveness -0.197 -0.381
(0.160) (0.281)






















 Standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Two outliers were excluded from the analysis.
e












Figure 2.5. Slopes of subgroup analysis on median-split samples for Organizational Celebrity (2 subgroups). a 
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Table 2.9. Subgroup analysis on median-split samples for Organizational Celebrity (4 subgroups). a, b, c, d 
N=823 N=2,174 N=369 N=235 N=1,129 N=1,045
n=160 n=243 n=106 n=91 n=155 n=195



































Awards 0.750 0.930 0.883 n.a. 1.170
*
0.913
Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements 0.941 1.459
**
1.230 0.664 1.248 1.631
Tenure 0.804 0.989 0.751 1.009 1.033 0.989
Founder Role 0.525 0.892 n.a. 0.811 1.135 0.764






Organizational-focused PR 1.748 2.266
***
- - - -






 *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<.05
b  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
c  
Odds ratios calculated on logistic regression coefficients from pooled OLS estimation models on median-split samples and cluster-robust VCE. 
d




















Table 2.10. Fixed effects results predicting continuous measure of Organizational 
Celebrity. a, b, c, d 



















(0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.099) (0.090)


















(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047)
Tenure 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.021 0.021
(0.0170 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Founder Role -0.025 -0.247 -0.255 -0.257 -0.363 -0.360 -0.364 -0.340 -0.301
(0.214) (0.213) (0.214) (0.214) (0.254) (0.253) (0.253) (0.234) (0.226)
CEO Celebrity (t-1) -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 -0.047 0.056 -0.056 0.056 -0.054 -0.059
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060)


















(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.055) (0.052)
















































































AIC 7108.379 7108.599 7107.014 7107.577 6954.425 6955.621 6955.235 6811.948 6748.567













 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Fixed effect estimation.
e
 Two outliers were excluded from this analysis.  
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X 
Strategic Distinctiveness
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X 
Industry Distinctiveness
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X 
Organizational-focused PR
Strategic Distinctiveness X 
Organizational-focused PR
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Organizational-focused PR







a Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.10 (Model 8).  






a Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.10 (Model 9).  
Figure 2.7. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of Organizational Celebrity – Industry Distinctiveness. a 
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Table 2.11. Fixed effects logit results predicting CEO Celebrity – Strategic 
Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e 
 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Awards -0.076 -0.075 -0.075 -0.076 -0.106 -0.088 -0.104 -0.106 -0.107 -0.075 -0.108
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114) (.113) (0.112)















(0.186) (0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.188) (0.193) (0.198) -0.199 (0.202) (0.203) (0.199)






















(0.218) (0.219) (0.224) (0.221) (0.224) (0.225) (0.237) (0.239) (0.241) (0.247) (0.243)
CEO Celebrity (t-1) 0.055 0.055 0.061 0.061 0.015 0.020 -0.025 -0.015 -0.009 -0.091 -0.027
(0.180) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.174) (0.174) (0.172) (0.173) (0.177) (0.180) (0.171)
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions -0.010 0.045 0.051 0.024 0.014 -0.003 0.038 0.022 0.034 -0.084















(0.121) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.134) (0.142) (0.151) (0.176) (0.159)
Industry Distinctiveness 0.044 0.051 0.044 0.061 0.053 0.051 0.024 0.033





































(0.119) (0.119) (0.187) (0.120) (0.118)
-0.182 -0.155 -0.245 -0.037





























































AIC 987.580 991.575 990.098 991.984 975.652 974.293 964.159 964.499 967.679 952.037 965.045













 Jackknife standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Fixed effect estimation.
e
 Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.  




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Founder Role
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Tenure









Table 2.12. Fixed effects logit results predicting CEO Celebrity – Industry 
Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Awards -0.076 -0.075 -0.075 -0.076 -0.106 -0.088 -0.104 -0.105 -0.100 -0.075 -0.103
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.112)















(0.186) (0.191) (0.190) (0.190) (0.188) (0.193) (0.198) (0.199) (0.205) (0.204) (0.198)






















(0.218) (0.219) (0.224) (0.221) (0.224) (0.225) (0.237) (0.239) (0.239) (0.249) (0.239)
CEO Celebrity (t-1) 0.055 0.055 0.061 0.061 0.015 0.02 -0.025 -0.024 -0.015 -0.082 -0.035
(0.180) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.174) (0.174) (0.172) (0.172) (0.175) (0.177) (0.170)
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions -0.010 0.045 0.051 0.024 0.014 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.029 -0.130



















(0.121) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.134) (0.136) (0.135) (0.165) (0.146)
Industry Distinctiveness 0.044 0.051 0.044 0.061 0.064 0.030 0.047 0.036



































(0.119) (0.119) (0.188) (0.120) (0.120)
-0.019 0.045 0.018 0.163
































































AIC 987.580 991.575 990.098 991.984 975.652 974.293 964.159 966.135 970.631 959.972 965.268













 Jackknife standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Fixed effect estimation.
e
 Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.  
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Tenure




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Founder Role
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness
















a Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.12 (Model 11).  
Figure 2.8. Fixed effects slopes predicting CEO Celebrity. a 
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Table 2.13. Subgroup analysis on founder-split samples for CEO celebrity. a, b, c, d, e 
  
Founder Not Founder






























































Standard errors in parentheses.
c 
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d  
Pooled OLS estimation models on split samples and cluster-robust VCE. 
e
 Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.  
N=642 N=2,354
n=99 n=170




Table 2.14. Fixed effects results predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity – 
Strategic Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e 























(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.106) (0.104)
Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.030 -0.033 0.031 0.029
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)





















(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109)





















(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143)
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.016
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Strategic Distinctiveness -0.030
*
-0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.017 -0.012 -0.015 -0.017















(0.015) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Tenure 0.049 0.054 0.057 0.058 -0.057 0.058 0.048
(0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.074)
Founder Role -0.079 -0.079 -0.074 -0.085 -0.081 0.064





























































AIC 9382.82 9384.61 9385.43 9525.52 9385.56 9387.34 9381.45 9382.19 9384.18 9387.91 9384.84













 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Fixed effect estimation.
d
 Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.  
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Tenure




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
Founder Role
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Strategic Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR







Figure 2.9. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity – Strategic Distinctiveness. a 
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Table 2.15. Fixed effects results predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity – 
Industry Distinctiveness. a, b, c, d, e 























(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.010) (0.104)
Ratio of Positive Performance Annuncements 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.037 0.032 0.029
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)






















(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108)





















(0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.140) (0.143)
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.024 0.023 0.026 0.005
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Strategic Distinctiveness -0.030
*
-0.019 -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.021 -0.018 -0.020 -0.025
†

















(0.015) (0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Tenure 0.049 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.056 0.050
(0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.065) (0.074)
Founder Role -0.079 -0.079 -0.080 -0.092 -0.096 -0.035











(0.043) (0.043) (0.030) (0.043) (0.043)
-0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.002











































AIC 9382.818 9384.61 9385.43 9525.52 9385.56 9387.34 9381.45 9383.06 9385.03 9385.22 9382.58













 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
c  
Year fixed effects were included in all models.
d
 Fixed effect estimation.
d
 Three outliers were excluded from this analysis.  
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Tenure




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
Founder Role
Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness




Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions X
Industry Distinctiveness X
CEO-focused PR









a Slopes based on estimates from Table 2.15 (Model 11).  
Figure 2.10. Fixed effects slopes predicting continuous measure of CEO Celebrity – Industry Distinctiveness. a 
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H1a: Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions --> (+) 
Organizational Celebrity
H2a: Ratio of Posititve Competitive Actions -->(+) 










H3a: Ratio of Posititve & Distinctive Competitive 







H1b: Ratio of Positive Competitive Actions --> (+) 
CEO Celebrity
H2b: Ratio of Posititve Competitive Actions -->(+) 










H3b: Ratio of Posititve & Distinctive Competitive 










H4: Ratio of Posititve & Distincitve Competitive 










H4: Ratio of Posititve & Distinctive Competitive 





















Celebrity is a common phenomenon in modern society (Gamson, 1992; Rindova et al., 
2006) and has become an important aspect characterizing how organizations and their members 
are perceived by stakeholders and constituents. Within the context of organizational studies, 
celebrity has been investigated at the individual – e.g. CEOs and entrepreneurs – and 
organizational levels – e.g. Apple and Tesla. Being in the media spotlight, these social actors 
become celebrities known and acclaimed by audiences, within and beyond the boundaries of 
their industries.  
Emerging from previous literature on celebrity is an initial appreciation of how individual 
and organizational celebrity are achieved, and a preliminary understanding of their distinctive 
effects on organizational outcomes. However, research on this important social approval asset 
has suffered from two main shortcomings.  First, research on the construct at the individual- and 
organizational-levels has largely proceeded independently, despite suggestions the two may be 
interdependent (Rindova et al., 2006). This has hindered our understanding of how celebrity 
develops at one level or the other, how celebrity at different levels co-evolves over time, and 
what are the performance implications of achieving celebrity across multiple organizational 
levels.  
Second, empirical research on celebrity at both the individual- and organizational levels 
has mostly focused on investigating the effects of these important social approval assets on 
organizational processes and outcomes. Sparse attention, however, has been given to empirically 
investigate the theoretical claims on the antecedents of individual and organizational celebrity.  
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In this dissertation, I attempted to address these gaps in the literature. In Essay 1, I 
theorize how and why celebrity emerges at different organizational levels, how individual and 
organizational celebrity co-evolve over time, and with what performance implications. In essay 
2, I empirically investigate the antecedents of CEO and organizational celebrity and find only 
partial support for the theoretical claims about the role of distinctive actions in fostering the 
development of celebrity.  
Multiple theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions are offered in this 
dissertation. First, I contribute to theory on celebrity by identifying factors affecting the 
development of celebrity at different organizational levels. I suggest that celebrity development 
at different organizational levels is affected by the resonance of individual or organizational 
attributional frames. In doing so, I highlight how celebrity is developed through a co-creation 
process where multiple social actors are involved (i.e. journalists, organizations and 
organizational members), and move the theory a step further in understanding why and how 
celebrity emerges at different organizational levels. Second, I contribute to theory on celebrity by 
developing a theoretical model that addresses how individual and organizational celebrity co-
evolve over time, and by discussing the potential performance implications of these two 
constructs when occurring together. Third, I advance current theory on celebrity by empirically 
investigating whether “standing out through nonconforming strategic actions” (Rindova et al., 
2006: 59) affects the likelihood of achieving this important social approval asset at both the 
individual- and organizational-level, and investigating the role of organizational communication 
materials in facilitating the adoption of specific attributional frames in the media coverage. 
Fourth, building on the role of media as the distinctive characteristic of celebrity (Rindova et al., 
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2006) and on established standards in the study of organizational celebrity (Pfarrer et al., 2010), I 
used a complementary measure of CEO celebrity. The use of measures for the operationalization 
of CEO and organizational celebrity that are complementary, yet distinctive from the 
operationalization of other social approval assets, has the potential not only to facilitate future 
research on the construct at multiple levels, but also to foster our ability to identify the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of their development processes, as opposed to the development of 
other important social approval assets such as reputation or status.  
Overall, the media affect organizational actions and performance by impacting the 
prominence and perceptions of organizations and their members in the public mind. Knowing 
how media coverage of business events comes about is the first step for managing it. To this 
extent, the theoretical model and empirical study developed here bare important practical 
implications, as they lend understanding of under what circumstances the media adopt the 
individual and organizational frames that foster the development of celebrity at different 
organizational levels. I expect that the theory developed here will increase our understanding of 
these important social approval assets and stimulate further research on the relationship between 
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